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Joe is single and looking for love. Frustrated with singles
bars and blind dates, he does what millions of other people in
his position do-he visits an Internet dating website where he
meets Susanna. On their Internet profiles, both Susanna and
Joe give inaccurate self-portraits. Susanna knocks ten pounds
off her weight and omits her two kids by previous boyfriends.
Joe adds two inches to his height, mentions that he never
drinks, and fails to note that he is a recovering alcoholic with
two DUI convictions. By the time they meet and discover these
missing pieces of information, it doesn't matter. They have al-
ready fallen in love.
Susanna and Joe marry, and she and her two children
move to Joe's hometown to be with him. Joe works construc-
tion, and Susanna stays home with the kids. About a year later,
Susanna decides that the marriage isn't working and divorces
Joe. The divorce court rules that the marriage was short-term
and that, therefore, Susanna and Joe's separate property has
not become "marital property"; the court essentially leaves each
of them with the property they brought to the marriage. The
court also rules against Susanna's request for alimony, noting
that she is twenty-eight years old, has experience as a medical
technician, and can easily find work. Susanna and Joe's mar-
riage has a clean break-neither is required to provide for the
other in the future.
If we change the facts slightly, however, the outcome
changes dramatically. Imagine now that Susanna is not
Susanna but instead Svetlana, an immigrant from Ukraine.
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She and Joe meet each other on an Internet dating website that
enables American men to meet foreign women. Under U.S. im-
migration law, before the website can provide Joe with Svet-
lana's e-mail address, Joe has to disclose his criminal back-
ground (including his two DUIs), the number of minor children
he has, any previous marriages, and a list of all states he has
lived in since the age of eighteen. (He can still lie about his
height.) Svetlana does not have to disclose anything-including
her two children.
Despite finding out about Joe's prior drinking problems,
Svetlana falls for Joe. In order to qualify for a fianc6 visa to
come to the United States, Svetlana must meet Joe in person,
so he makes an expensive trip to Ukraine for that purpose.
They discover that they are as attracted to each other in person
as they were over e-mail, and Joe also discovers that Svetlana
has two children. In order to facilitate their living together, Joe
sponsors Svetlana and her two kids on a fianc6 visa; they come
to the United States, and Joe and Svetlana marry less than
three months later, as they must to prevent her deportation.
When Svetlana applies to become a permanent resident, Joe
files the required affidavit of support as her sponsor, attesting
that his income is sufficient to support a wife and two children.
The couple undergoes an interview in which they must prove to
immigration officials that their marriage is bona fide-that
they are marrying for love, and not just to obtain immigration
status for Svetlana.
Joe and Svetlana are successful in demonstrating the bona
fides of their marriage, and Svetlana obtains conditional per-
manent residency. Because she and Joe have been married for
less than two years at the time of her immigration, she must
wait two more years before achieving actual permanent resi-
dency (a green card). The marriage is rocky, and Svetlana sus-
pects early on that it may have been a mistake. But she hopes
for the best, and she wants that green card. So she does the
things that her lawyer advises her to do to convince the immi-
gration authorities that her marriage has been genuine from
the beginning. (As it was-like most people, Svetlana thought
her marriage was going to succeed when she entered into it.)
She continues to live with Joe, opens joint bank accounts, and
even becomes pregnant with his child. When the two years are
up, Joe and Svetlana are interviewed again by immigration of-
ficials, who determine that their marriage is bona fide. Svet-
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lana gets her green card, and within a few weeks files for di-
vorce.
Along with the divorce papers, Svetlana files a lawsuit to
enforce the affidavit of support that Joe filed to sponsor her as
an immigrant. Despite the court's refusal to grant Svetlana ali-
mony or a share of Joe's pre-marriage property, the court holds
that Joe must pay Svetlana the amount of money per year that
it would take to keep her and her two children above 125% of
the poverty line: $20,112 dollars in 2005, and likely more in fu-
ture years. This obligation will end only when Svetlana be-
comes a citizen or has worked for forty Social Security quarters
(about ten years). Svetlana does neither, so Joe continues to
support Svetlana and her children until his death.
Joe and Susanna's encounters with family law are fairly
typical examples of how state law regulation of marriage cur-
rently operates. Marriage can be thought of as having four
stages: the courtship stage, in which the couple meets and de-
cides to marry; the entry stage, in which the couple undergoes
whatever licensing and ceremonial requirements are necessary
to achieve marital status; the intact marriage stage, in which
the couple is legally married; and the exit stage, in which the
couple divorces, has the marriage annulled, or one of the
spouses dies. State marriage law today primarily regulates
marriage only during the entry and exit stages, and even then,
the regulation is very light.
Typically, the only requirements for getting married are
reaching a certain age, not being already married, and finding
a mate of the opposite sex who is not a close blood relative.
Likewise, in the vast majority of jurisdictions, couples can get
divorced for any reason or no reason at all. No matter whether
one spouse is a liar, a cheat, a thief, a killer, or an addict-and
no matter whether he lies to his prospective spouse about the
fact that he is one of those things-if he can find someone to
marry him, he can get married, and the state will have nothing
to say about it. And if he wants a divorce, he can get one, even
if he behaved very badly during the marriage and his spouse
was a saint.
In contrast, immigration law regulates heavily all four
stages of marriage. As shown through the story of Joe and Svet-
lana, immigration law permits government intervention at all
points in a marriage, from the very early stages of courtship
until "death do us part," even when the couple has already cho-
sen to part by divorcing. And immigration law does not just af-
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fect the marriages of immigrants-it also affects the marriages
of citizens like Joe, if they happen to marry foreigners. If family
law is defined as any law that regulates "the creation and dis-
solution of legally recognized family relationships, and/or de-
termines the legal rights and responsibilities of family mem-
bers,"' then for people in Joe or Svetlana's position, federal
immigration law is family law.
It should not be surprising that federal immigration law
has a lot to say about marriage. Legal immigration status is a
scarce resource: many people want it and Congress has made
the decision to limit access to a select group of people-those
who are family members of U.S. residents or citizens, those
who are sponsored by U.S.-based employers, and those lucky
few who win a diversity lottery and are randomly chosen for
admission.2 Because marriage is the most common legal
mechanism for creating state-sanctioned couplehood, marriage
is an important category for family-based regulation. 3 In 2005
alone, nearly 300,000 immigrants were granted permanent
residence as spouses of U.S. citizens or residents. 4 Once Con-
gress has decided to use marital status as a means of granting
immigration status, it necessarily follows that Congress will de-
fine and interpret what marriage means and shape and regu-
late marriage through the immigration process.
Despite its important role in regulating marriage, federal
immigration law is not generally thought of as a form of family
law. Scholars, lawyers, and courts generally look to state family
law as the domain of marriage regulation. Family law scholar-
ship has never considered in detail how immigration law might
function as family law and thereby regulate familial relation-
ships in ways that go far beyond what state family law would
1. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REv. 825,
871 (2004).
2. There are also special categories for refugees and asylum seekers who
wish to migrate because they are being persecuted in their countries of origin.
See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §§ 207-208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1158
(2000).
3. A handful of states have recently adopted, either by statute or by
court order, civil unions for same-sex partners. See infra Part III.A. And some
states will recognize domestic partnerships for limited purposes. See infra
notes 169-72 and accompanying text. But in most jurisdictions, marriage re-
mains the primary way in which the state recognizes intimate adult relation-
ships.
4. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRA-
TION STATISTICS 18 tbl.6, 20 tbl.7 (2006).
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consider permissible. 5 Indeed, a pervasive myth in case law is
that state family law has a monopoly on the marriage business:
federal courts abstain from hearing state family law cases 6 and
strike down statutes if they think that Congress has gone be-
yond the scope of its Commerce Clause powers and is threaten-
ing to interfere with domestic relations issues. 7 But there is a
large body of law that some scholars have recently shown con-
stitutes federal family law.8 This body of federal family law in-
cludes the law of federal income tax,9 bankruptcy, 10 social secu-
rity,1 welfare, 12 Indian affairs, 13 family leave, 14 and interstate
5. Cf. Hasday, supra note 1, at 877-78 (including a brief discussion of the
effect of the immediate relative category on family law rights).
6. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 696-97 (1992) (recogniz-
ing a domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction for cases in-
volving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree).
7. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599, 617-18 (2000) (over-
turning section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as exceed-
ing Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and expressing a concern
that if the Court were to uphold the civil rights remedy in VAWA, Congress
could use the Commerce Clause to justify legislating the area of "family law
and other areas of state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, di-
vorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant");
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting in dicta that if Con-
gress's powers were not so limited then Congress could "regulate any activity
that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens:
family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody)").
8. See Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
197, 197-258 (1999); Kristin Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradi-
tion of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States' Rights, 26 CARDozo L.
REV. 1761, 1761-65 (2005); Hasday, supra note 1, at 875-80; Jill Elaine Has-
day, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1370-
86 (1998); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction,
and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1721-30 (1991); Reva B.
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 947-1046 (2002).
9. See generally Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism
in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997);
Patricia A. Cain, Dependency, Taxes, and Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 267 (2002); Shari Motro, A New I Do: Towards a Marriage-
Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006).
10. See generally Tisha Morris Federico, The Impact of the Defense of
Marriage Act on Section 302 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Resulting Re-
newed Interest in the Equitable Doctrine of Substantive Consolidation, 103
COM. L.J. 82 (1998).
11. See generally Dorothy A. Brown, Social Security and Marriage in
Black and White, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 111 (2004).
12. See generally Adler, supra note 8; Tonya Brito, The Welfarization of
Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229 (2000); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Re-
turn of the Ring: Welfare Reform's Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum
Control, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1647 (2005).
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family court jurisdiction. 15 And as I demonstrated in a previous
article, from the time of the passage of the first federal immi-
gration law in 1875, immigration law has used and shaped the
institution of marriage in myriad ways. 16
Just as family law scholarship has neglected to consider
immigration law as a form of family law, immigration scholar-
ship has largely passed by the family law aspects of immigra-
tion. Despite the reality that a majority of immigrants enter
the country through relationships to U.S. citizen or resident
family members, the family law aspects of immigration law
have been overshadowed in immigration scholarship by consti-
tutional questions (e.g., the plenary power doctrine, theories of
citizenship), the role of labor incentives in immigration (e.g.,
labor markets, employer sanctions), and the role of criminal
law in immigration law (e.g., deportation categories, conse-
quences of plea agreements). 17 Only a handful of scholars have
considered family-based immigration as a serious topic for
scholarship.' 8 And no one has undertaken a study of how im-
migration law uses and shapes marriage in particular.
13. See generally Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native Ameri-
can: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IowA L. REV.
585 (1994).
14. See generally Naomi Cahn, Gendered Identities: Women and House-
hold Work, 44 VILL. L. REV. 525 (1999).
15. See Hasday, supra note 1, at 877-78.
16. Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Im-
migration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005).
17. Dozens of articles have been written on each of these topics. See, e.g.,
Howard F. Chang, Immigration and the Workplace: Immigration Restrictions
as Employment Discrimination, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 291 (2003); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the
Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995); Maria Isabel Medina, The
Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage
Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669 (1997); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious
Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Consti-
tutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992); Leticia M. Saucedo, The Em-
ployer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Col-
lar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
18. See Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Cover-
ture's Diminishment, but Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 153, 174-77
(2004) [hereinafter Calvo, Decade] (arguing that despite the passage of the
Violence Against Women Act, the INA is still a manifestation of coverture and
chastisement principles); Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws:
The Legacies of Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593, 604 (1991) (arguing that
the INA embodies common law principles of coverture and chastisement);
Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and
Marriage?: Immigration Law's Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273,
16312007]
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But immigration law's regulation of marriage matters. In a
federal system in which states have primary authority over
family law issues, and in which the political branches of the
federal government, through the plenary power doctrine, have
exclusive control over immigration, immigration law provides
Congress an unusual opportunity to engage in extensive regu-
lation of an area that would normally be off limits. This fact
has important implications for family law theory and scholar-
ship because it calls into question state law's primacy in the
family law area and exposes the legal regulation of marriage as
more pervasive, in some contexts, than the dominant stories
about family law regulation would admit. And it has important
implications for immigration law and scholarship as well. Con-
gress's plenary power to regulate immigration has generally
been characterized as a "power inherent in sovereignty" that is
necessary to a self-governing nation.19 Looking closely at how
Congress regulates marriage through immigration law might
better help us to articulate where plenary power ends and state
regulation of family law begins. In order to begin to answer
these questions, we need a much more complete understanding
of how, when, and why Congress regulates marriage through
immigration law.
This Article takes a first step toward mapping the architec-
ture of marriage regulation in immigration law. It compares
immigration law's regulation of marriage with that of tradi-
293-96 (2003) (arguing that the government should place more weight on fam-
ily ties in immigration policy); Lolita Buckner Inniss, Dutch Uncle Sam: Im-
migration Reform and Notions of Family, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 177, 177-
200 (1997) (tracing the history of family-based immigration in England, Hol-
land, and the United States); Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right
to Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties
in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens' Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725, 732
(1996) (proposing a "constitutionally humane approach" that erases distinc-
tions between citizens and residents in family unity immigration); Hiroshi Mo-
tomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the Ruritanian Law-
maker, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 511, 511-12 (1995) (outlining ten questions any
country must ask in determining how to structure family-based immigration);
David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Chil-
dren's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 980 (2002)
(arguing that immigration law reinforces conceptions of children that limit
their recognition as persons and silence their voices); Leti Volpp, Divesting
Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through
Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 405-83 (2005) (tracing the history of laws
that divested women of citizenship if they married foreigners).
19. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) ("The
power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the
government of the United States .... ").
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tional family law in each of the four stages of marriage and
considers how immigration law might tell us something impor-
tant about how Americans-or at least lawmakers--envision
marriage today. The Article provides a taxonomy of reasons
why Congress regulates marriage through immigration law and
suggests how courts and scholars might determine the legiti-
macy of congressional action in this area.
Part I provides a broad overview of how and why immigra-
tion law uses marital status as a central organizing principle
and explains why Congress's plenary power over immigration is
so broad. Parts II, III, IV, and V examine each of the four
stages of marriage, demonstrating how immigration law's regu-
lation of marriage in each stage is quite different than state
family law. Part VI shows how conceiving of immigration law
as a form of family law is important and how this approach
could alter the way we understand both immigration law and
family law.
I. MARRIAGE AND IMMIGRATION LAW
Family law scholars have long argued that the explicit le-
gal regulation of the family is on the decline. 20 This decline is
not a decline from a super-regulatory regime, but rather from
one where the doctrine of family privacy already made legal in-
tervention into the family relatively rare. As Carl Schneider
has explained, "The law not only suspects that intervention will
do harm; it doubts that intervention will do good: in family law
as in few other areas of the law, the enforcement problems are
ubiquitous and severe."21
20. See Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The
Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 34 ("[M]any perceive the legal sys-
tem as having become less judgmental of what people should expect of one an-
other."); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of Ameri-
can Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1807-08 (1985) (arguing that "the
legal tradition of noninterference in family affairs, the ideology of liberal indi-
vidualism, American society's changing moral beliefs, and the rise of 'psy-
chologic man"' have all contributed to a "diminution of the law's discourse in
moral terms about the relations between family members"). But see Hasday,
supra note 1, at 834-54 (arguing that family law scholars overstate the decline
of state law regulation).
21. Schneider, supra note 20, at 1837; see also Judith Hicks Stiehm, Gov-
ernment and the Family: Justice and Acceptance, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE
FAMILY 361, 362 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979) ("The gov-
ernment is only too happy to avoid having either to forbid or to require par-
ticular interpersonal behavior.").
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Family law currently shapes marriage in two limited ways:
(1) by defining who can enter the status of marriage and (2) by
passing judgment on individual marriages during their dissolu-
tion.22 It is usually only at these two transformative moments-
entry into and exit from marriage-that state law intervenes.
The corollary of this principle, of course, is that state family
law does not regulate marriage during its other two stages:
courtship and the intact marriage.23 In contrast to state family
law, the federal immigration system passes judgment on and
influences decision making in marriages involving immigrants
throughout the four stages of marriage: courtship, entry, intact
marriage, and exit.
In order to understand the values embedded in the immi-
gration law system and the way in which immigration law
shapes immigrant marriages, we must consider how the immi-
gration system functions. This Part explains how marriage
functions as a category in U.S. immigration law and why Con-
gress is able to regulate immigration so extensively.
A. MARRIAGE AS A CENTRAL ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE
Perhaps the most obvious way in which immigration law
uses formal marital status as a building block is in how it privi-
leges married couples for purposes of obtaining immigrant vi-
sas. An immigrant visa grants a foreign national permanent
resident or green card status. Permanent resident status is in
turn the usual prerequisite for obtaining naturalized citizen-
ship. 24 There are several ways that an aspiring immigrant can
obtain permanent resident status: (1) as a family member of a
U.S. citizen or resident;25 (2) as an employee of a U.S. com-
22. Stiehm, supra note 21, at 362 ('The state does establish a legal basis
for the family's existence, but this defining function is exercised principally
when families are either being founded, as in marriage and adoption, or dis-
solved, as in divorce and death.").
23. Family law arguably does intervene in intact marriages to the extent
that it exempts married couples from laws that would otherwise apply to
them, such as rape law. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A
Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1375-76 (2000) (describ-
ing the marital rape exception); see also infra Part IV (examining how family
law and immigration law regulate the intact marriage).
24. See INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2000). The technical term is
Lawful Permanent Resident, or LPR. This is a person who has obtained a
green card and is therefore entitled to stay in the country indefinitely, but who
has not yet become a naturalized citizen. Throughout this Article, I refer to
LPRs as "permanent residents."
25. Id. § 201(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1).
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pany;26 (3) as a refugee or asylee;2 7 or (4) through the "diversity
lottery," a (somewhat) random allocation of a small percentage
of available immigration slots to residents of "underrepre-
sented" countries. 28 Of these four categories, family-based im-
migration is the largest. For example, in the year 2005,
1,122,373 immigrants were admitted to the United States on
immigrant visas.29 Of these, 292,741 were spouses of U.S. citi-
zens or residents and 186,304 were children of U.S. citizens or
residents. 30 Marriage, in turn, affects the child category be-
cause the definition of child depends in part on the marital
status of the child's parents.3 1 Those who entered based on em-
ployment status or as a refugee or asylee in the same year
numbered 246,878 and 142,962, respectively.32 Family-based
immigration accounted for nearly half of all legal immigration
in 2005, with spousal immigration accounting for more than
one-quarter of all immigration.
Marital status is important not only as an admissions
category, but also because it can qualify an immigrant for an
exception or waiver if she is being denied entry as ineligible or
is facing deportation. Generally, even when a person is other-
wise entitled to an immigrant visa (for example, as the wife of a
U.S. citizen), that person can be deemed "inadmissible" if she
meets one of several criteria, including lying about immigration
status, 33 using falsified documents to obtain entry,34 or being
convicted of a crime. 35 Such persons will not receive immigrant
visas even though they meet the other statutory criteria.
Spouses of U.S. citizens or residents, however, are eligible for
discretionary waivers of many of these inadmissibility provi-
sions. For example, immigrants who engage in fraud or misrep-
resentation may nevertheless be granted green cards if their
citizen or permanent resident spouses will otherwise experi-
26. Id. § 201(a)(2).
27. Id. § 201(b)(1)(B).
28. Id. § 201(a)(3).
29. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 18 tbl.6, 20 tbl.7.
30. Id.
31. INA § 101(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b).
32. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 20 tbl.7.
33. INA § 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 212(a)(2).
2007] 1635
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ence "extreme hardship."3 6 A similar waiver exists for immi-
grants who have committed certain crimes.37
In addition to privileging marriage as an immigration
category, current immigration law is designed in a way that
privileges the U.S. citizen or resident spouse's desires in decid-
ing whether to grant immigration status to a foreign spouse.
With very few exceptions, immigrant spouses, children, and
siblings cannot self-petition, but instead must wait for a family
member with residency or citizenship status to petition on their
behalf. In other words, immigration law allows family members
with status to define who their families are for immigration
purposes, as long as those individuals fall within the desig-
nated formal categories.38
Finally, immigration law privileges some marital relation-
ships over others. Spouses of U.S. citizens can achieve green-
card status as "immediate relatives" of U.S. citizens. As imme-
diate relatives, they are not subject to any immigration quotas,
so the wait for a green card is simply a matter of processing de-
lays. 39 Spouses of U.S. residents (green card holders), on the
other hand, achieve green-card status through the "family pref-
erence" category, which is subject to annual quotas. Accord-
ingly, they must submit to long waits before they can join their
U.S. resident spouses. 40 Currently, the wait is approximately
five years. 41
The use of familial relationships as a cornerstone of immi-
gration admissions is a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to
36. Id. § 212(i)(1).
37. Id. § 212(h)(1)(B). Exceptions to the default rules are also available in
deportation proceedings for spouses of U.S. citizens or permanent residents
and for some immigrants seeking cancellation of removal under INA section
240A. Id. § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). To obtain this relief, some im-
migrants must show "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to a family
member. Id. § 240A(b)(1)(D). Even those immigrants who are not required to
show hardship to a family member must still convince an immigration judge to
exercise favorable discretion; important discretionary factors include the exis-
tence of family ties in the United States and hardship to family members. See
In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85 (B.I.A. 1978) (listing discretionary
factors).
38. For an argument that the "power to petition is a legacy of coverture"
that disadvantages female spouses, see Calvo, Decade, supra note 18, at 188.
39. INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b).
40. Id. § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a); id. § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
41. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BULL. No. 9514, VISA BULLETIN FOR APRIL
2007 (2007), available at http://travel.state.gov/nsa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_3169
.html.
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1965, immigration admissions were allocated based on national
origin. Beginning with the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, Congress
restricted immigration so that immigrants would racially repli-
cate the current U.S. population and thus maintain a popula-
tion that was of primarily northern European descent. 42 For
example, annual immigration quotas were imposed on particu-
lar countries as follows: Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
65,721; Germany, 25,957; Turkey, 226; and Liberia, 100. 43
By 1965, the overt racism of the immigration quotas had
become politically untenable. 44 Congress abolished the national
origins system and put in its place admissions categories based
on family relationship and employment potential. 45 The policy
underlying the family relationship categories is usually re-
ferred to as "family unification" or "family reunification."
Family unification has been valued for several reasons.
One is a practical reason: as Professor Nora Demleitner has
demonstrated, immigrants who have families living with them
are more stable and more likely to integrate into society. 46 This
stability, some believe, reduces crime, increases immigrant
economic productivity, and prevents the immigrant from send-
ing the money he or she earns to a different economy through
remittances to family members who remain in the country of
origin. 47 The belief that family ties promote stability and as-
similation is reflected in the fast track to citizenship given to
spouses of U.S. citizens, who need to wait only three years after
obtaining a green card to apply for citizenship, rather than the
usual five.48
Support for the policy of family unification also arises from
the notion that Americans, as citizens, have an interest in
forming families, and that this interest includes the right to
form families with people who are not U.S. citizens. Consider,
for example, the way in which Congress has repeatedly made it
possible for U.S. military personnel living overseas to marry
people living in those countries and bring them back to the
42. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAK-
ING OF MODERN AMERICA 21-25 (2004).
43. Id. at 28 tbl.1.i.
44. See SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMI-
GRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 205-07 (1981).
45. Id. at 207.
46. Demleitner, supra note 18, at 285.
47. Id. at 285-86.
48. INA § 319(a), 8 U.S.C § 1430(a) (2000).
2007] 1637
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
United States as immediate relatives.49 Note that these laws
are not about "unifying" existing families, but rather about al-
lowing Americans to create new ones. Thus, they are not con-
cerned with the desirability of the potential immigrants so
much as with allowing citizens to engage in the pursuit of hap-
piness. 50
But family unification has limits as a policy goal. Impor-
tantly, it competes with other policy goals, such as keeping the
total number of immigrants to a lower level than an "open bor-
ders" policy would allow and keeping out criminals, the poor,
and the diseased. Thus, while family unification policy forms
the basis of the admissions categories, competing policies cur-
tail the frequency and speed with which families are united.
B. CONGRESS'S PLENARY POWER TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION
Immigration law uses marriage as a category for assigning
immigration status and does this as part of an explicit policy
goal of family unification. These laws, by their nature, privilege
families over friends and privilege married couples over un-
married cohabiting ones. Sometimes Congress's regulation of
immigration has led to immigration laws that discriminate in
other ways, for example, by treating illegitimate children and
legitimate children differently, 51 or by divesting a woman of
citizenship if she married a foreigner.52 The ability of Congress
to exercise this power contrasts sharply with constraints on
both federal and state governments in regulating marriage.
49. See, e.g., G.I. Fianc6es Act, Pub. L. No. 79-471, 60 Stat. 339 (1946)
(broadening the scope of the preference for marriage to a U.S. citizen by facili-
tating admission of armed forces members' fianc~s); War Brides Act, Pub. L.
No. 79-271, 59 Stat. 659 (1945) (providing nonquota immigrant status to alien
spouses and alien minor children of U.S. citizens serving or having served in
the U.S. armed forces during World War II).
50. Todd Stevens has chronicled how some immigrants successfully ar-
gued that they were entitled to the company of their wives to overcome ra-
cially exclusive immigration laws in the early twentieth century. See Todd
Stevens, Tender Ties: Husbands' Rights and Racial Exclusion in Chinese Mar-
riage Cases, 1882-1924, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 271, 297 (2002) (arguing that
the tactic of seeking exemptions from existing immigration laws based on a
husband's right to the company of his wife achieved remarkable success in a
series of decisions in the 1890s and early 1900s, and that at least initially, a
Chinese woman's marital status trumped her racial classification).
51. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 800 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality
of INA sections 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2)).
52. Volpp, supra note 18, at 407-08 (reporting how U.S. law divested Chi-
nese citizens of their citizenship if they married foreigners).
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Generally, family law has been reserved for the states.
When Congress passes a federal statute-usually by invoking
its Commerce Clause power-that appears to meddle in state
family law matters, courts will strike down the statute as ex-
ceeding congressional authority.53 For example, in the famous
case of United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court struck
down the civil rights remedy for gender-motivated violence in
the federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).54 The pre-
vention and punishment of violence, the Court held, is a part of
the state police power, and even if gender-motivated violence
did affect interstate commerce in the aggregate, no one individ-
ual act of violence was likely to.55 In so holding, the Court
analogized gender-motivated violence's local character to that
of family law, expressing a concern that if the Court were to
uphold the civil rights remedy in VAWA, Congress could use
the Commerce Clause to justify legislating in the area of "fam-
ily law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the
national economy is undoubtedly significant."56 Congress can
only regulate the family when it crafts federal laws in ways
that purport to embody something other than family law, such
as taxation, social security, pensions, or immigration.57
Likewise, federal courts themselves will not hear cases
that involve state family law issues such as divorce or child
custody, even where federal jurisdiction would exist through
diversity jurisdiction. 58 And while states can make and adjudi-
cate family law, they are normally circumscribed in another
53. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000).
54. Id. at 627.
55. Id. at 617.
56. Id. at 615-16; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564
(1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding
Congress's commerce power and noting that if Congress's power was not so
limited, then it "could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage,
divorce, and child custody), for example"). For critiques of Morrison, see
Collins, supra note 8, at 1766-68; Siegel, supra note 8, at 1035-44.
57. See Hasday, supra note 1, at 875.
58. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702 (1992) (reversing
lower court opinions that denied diversity jurisdiction under the domestic re-
lations exception to a plaintiff seeking damages for child abuse). But see Has-
day, supra note 8, at 1372 (arguing that although courts frequently invoke the
domestic relations exception to support the idea that family law is inherently
local, the exception keeps federal courts out of family law in only a narrow
range of cases).
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way-the laws they pass must not abridge the constitutional
rights of their residents. Thus, the Supreme Court has struck
down state laws that violated equal protection or substantive
due process principles in a variety of family-related contexts:
upholding the right of a grandmother to cohabit with her
nonsibling grandsons despite contrary zoning laws, 59 the right
of a man to remarry despite being delinquent on his child sup-
port payments,60 the right of a prisoner to marry when it would
not contradict the goals of incarceration, 61 and the right of peo-
ple of different races to marry each other. 62
In contrast, when Congress regulates immigration, it can
pass laws that are overtly discriminatory and that would likely
not pass constitutional muster in a nonimmigration context.
Under the plenary power doctrine, Congress has near total
power to regulate immigration in whatever way it chooses, even
if in doing so it abridges what would be considered individual
constitutional rights in a nonimmigration context. 63 This broad
power is unusual in that it is not an enumerated Article I
power. Although courts and commentators have justified the
plenary power doctrine in part by analogizing the power over
immigration to the Article I powers to regulate naturaliza-
tion,64 to declare war,6 5 and to regulate foreign commerce, 66
even taken together these constitutional provisions do not pro-
vide a satisfactory basis for a power over immigration, least of
all a plenary power. Thus, the Supreme Court has had to look
59. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
60. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978).
61. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987).
62. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
63. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)
("[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more com-
plete than it is over [the power to exclude aliens]."), quoted in INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 1000 (1983); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
64. The law makes a distinction between immigration, which concerns the
movement of people across boundaries, and citizenship, which concerns mem-
bership within a political community (often regardless of geographic location).
See INA §§ 201-204, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1154 (2000) (setting forth categories for
immigration); id. §§ 301-347, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1458 (setting forth rules for
birthright and naturalized citizenship). Congress's power to "establish a uni-
form Rule of Naturalization" gives it the authority to set rules for access to
citizenship to those not born on U.S. soil. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The
Fourteenth Amendment only guarantees citizenship to those who are born on
U.S. soil. Id. amend. XIV. Neither provision says anything about immigration.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
66. Id. cl. 3.
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elsewhere for the origins of the power and has explained it as
an incident of sovereignty. 67 Beginning with Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (the famous "Chinese Exclusion Case"), the Court
traced the origins of the immigration power to the United
States' status as an independent, sovereign nation that must be
able to protect itself against foreign nations. 68 Preserving its
independence and giving "security against foreign aggression
and encroachment," the Court explained, is every sovereign na-
tion's duty.69 Foreign aggression could come in the form of an-
other country declaring war or instituting a policy intended to
hurt the United States, but it could also simply come from "vast
hordes of its people crowding in upon us"-from immigration. 70
Later cases further entrenched the plenary power doctrine,
extending the power to cover cases involving the race-based de-
portation of aliens, 71 the exclusion of aliens with contagious
diseases, 72 and the divestment of citizenship for women who
married foreign citizens. 73 Significantly, even in this latter
case, which explicitly regulated marriage, the Court attempted
to tie the marital regulation to an immigration purpose. The
marriage of a U.S. citizen to a foreigner, the Court explained,
"may involve national complications of like kind" as her physi-
cal expatriation. The act of marriage might "bring the Govern-
ment into embarrassments and, it may be, into controversies."74
Central to each of these cases was the idea that Congress needs
the unfettered authority to act in the international arena with-
67. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 606.
70. Id.; cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936) (holding that federal authority over foreign relations operates inde-
pendently of the Constitution and is inherent in the United States' existence
as a sovereign, independent nation).
71. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (holding
that the powers to exclude and to expel are "but parts of one and the same
power").
72. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909).
73. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) (upholding the Expa-
triation Act of 1907 and explaining that unity of citizenship for a husband and
a wife has "purpose if not necessity, in purely domestic policy [but] greater
purpose and, it may be, necessity, in international policy"). For more detailed
discussions of Mackenzie and the Expatriation Act, see CANDICE LEWIS BRED-
BENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF
CITIZENSHIP 56-70 (1998); Volpp, supra note 18, at 425-31.
74. Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 312.
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out foreign countries using the freedoms granted to Americans
against the United States' interests.
As a result of the plenary power doctrine, the Supreme
Court has upheld immigration laws that discriminate based on
race, sex, and illegitimacy-laws that might be unconstitu-
tional in a nonimmigration context.7 5 For example, in Fiallo v.
Bell, the Supreme Court upheld an immigration provision (no
longer in existence) that gave illegitimate children of female
citizens immediate relative status, but denied similar status to
illegitimate children of male citizens. 76 The statute clearly dis-
criminated in two ways that normally would have triggered the
application of heightened scrutiny: gender (by privileging
women over men) and illegitimacy (by making a distinction be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children). Yet in Fiallo, the
Court applied only the most toothless form of rational basis re-
view. 77 Ultimately, Congress is free to pass immigration legis-
lation that discriminates based on marriage, that discriminates
between types of marriages, or that even refuses to recognize
marriage for immigration purposes.78
75. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 724 (holding that Congress has the
power to expel any group of aliens "whenever in its judgment their removal is
necessary or expedient for the public interest"); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at
609 (upholding raced-based Chinese exclusion laws as a proper exercise of
Congress's "power of exclusion of foreigners"). More recently, the INS created
a National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS). As part of
NSEERS, male nationals of twenty-five designated countries, most of which
are predominantly Muslim, who are at least sixteen years of age and admitted
to the United States as nonimmigrants, were given a six-week window to re-
port to be photographed, fingerprinted, and interviewed under oath about
their reasons for being in the United States. See Registration of Certain Non-
immigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, Att'y Gen. Order No. 2643-2003,
68 Fed. Reg. 2363 (Jan. 16, 2003); Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant
Aliens from Designated Countries, Att'y Gen. Order No. 2638-2002, 67 Fed.
Reg. 77,642 (Dec. 18, 2002); Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens
from Designated Countries, Att'y Gen. Order No. 2631-2002, 67 Fed. Reg.
70,526 (Nov. 22, 2002); Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from
Designated Countries, Att'y Gen. Order No. 2626-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,766
(Nov. 6, 2002).
76. 430 U.S. 787, 797-800 (1977).
77. Courts disagree about whether Fiallo used rational basis review or an
even lower standard. Compare Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 495 (6th Cir.
2006) (stating that the Fiallo standard "may be even lower than rational basis
review"), with Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that the Fiallo test is the same as the rational basis test).
78. There is a growing international consensus that families have a right
to enter a state to reunify with family members. For example, immigrants in
Europe have successfully argued that a state's refusal to allow for family uni-
fication violates Article Eight of the European Convention on Human Rights'
REGULATION OF MARRIAGE
There is good reason to think that Fiallo, decided in 1977,
would come out similarly today. In 2001, the Court heard
Nguyen v. INS, which differed from Fiallo in that it concerned
the constitutionality of requirements that discriminated
against illegitimate children born abroad to U.S.-born fathers
who sought citizenship rather than immigration status. 79 The
majority opinion analyzed an equal protection claim lodged
against the statute using a conventional intermediate scrutiny
standard because it discriminated based on illegitimacy and
gender.8 0 The government has a legitimate interest, the Court
found, in giving citizenship status to children who have a genu-
ine relationship with their citizen parent, and because women
are "present" at the birth of their children, they are more likely
than men to develop such a relationship.81
For our purposes, Nguyen is interesting because, after ap-
plying traditional equal protection analysis, the majority also
mentioned that the plenary power doctrine might have applied
had the statute not survived this conventional analysis. Thus,
Nguyen suggests that the Court would have struck down the
statute using the plenary power doctrine had a conventional
approach not worked.8 2 Even more suggestive of the fate of
cases concerning immigration before the current Court, how-
ever, is the dissent by Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer), which attempted to distinguish
Nguyen from Fiallo on the grounds that Nguyen dealt with citi-
zenship, not immigration. Because the statute at issue in
Nguyen concerned citizenship, Justice O'Connor argued, it was
not passed under the plenary immigration power and should
therefore be subject to higher scrutiny.8 3 This dissent implies
that in a case squarely about the immigration family catego-
ries, even the Justices who would strike down discriminatory
(ECHR) guarantee of family life. See Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose: Torture,
Family Reunification, and United States Immigration Policy, 78 TEMP. L. REV.
897, 909 (2005). These cases are more likely to succeed if the family relation-
ship predates the immigration and the family cannot be reunited in the home
country; that is, "reunification" is more important than "unification." The
United States has no analogous law, but there is international pressure for a
uniform standard to be applied. However, because recognizing this law would
seriously undercut the plenary power doctrine, the United States is unlikely to
accede to it.
79. 533 U.S. 53, 96-97 (2001).
80. See id. at 60-61.
81. Id. at 64.
82. See id. at 72-73.
83. See id. at 96-97.
2007] 1643
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
citizenship laws would still apply extremely deferential Fiallo
review to immigration laws.
While the plenary power over immigration is broad, it is
not unlimited.8 4 Its origins lie in the right of the sovereign to
protect itself from the invasion of outsiders and the right to ex-
pel outsiders once they have gained physical access to the
United States.8 5 The Supreme Court has made a sharp distinc-
tion between immigration law, which regulates the exclusion
and deportation of aliens, and alienage law, which regulates
their presence here. Thus, in the famous case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, the Supreme Court struck down a California statute
discriminating against Chinese laundry operators on the
grounds that the law discriminated against aliens as a class.8 6
84. Recently, several scholars have argued that the plenary power doc-
trine is slowly being eroded by the courts through the narrow interpretation of
statutes, the use of the canon of constitutional avoidance, and the granting of
procedural due process rights. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 17, at 930-37;
Motomura, supra note 18, at 1631 ('CThe plenary power doctrine has eroded
significantly in the past few decades, and the evolution of procedural due proc-
ess as an exception to plenary power has been a critical part of this trend.");
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phan-
tom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,
549-50 (1990) (arguing that plenary power is declining not through direct at-
tack, but rather through the courts' narrow interpretation of statutes); Brian
G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine and Immigration Law, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2007) (manuscript at 32-37), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=933372 (arguing that because the plenary power doc-
trine has been weakened, there is more room for courts to use the canon of
constitutional avoidance to protect immigrants' rights). There is considerable
merit to these arguments. In Zadvydas v. Davis, for example, the Supreme
Court read a congressional statute as imposing an implied six-month time
limit on detention in order to avoid deciding whether indefinite detention of a
deportable, but stateless alien would violate his constitutional rights. 533 U.S.
678, 699-702 (2001). Similarly, in INS v. St. Cyr, the Court read a provision
that appeared on its face to strip federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to apply
only to appeals, leaving habeas untouched. 533 U.S. 289, 298-99, 314 (2001).
In both cases, the plenary power doctrine was officially left untouched, but the
Court forced an outcome that was protective of immigrants' rights. But tech-
niques such as narrow statutory interpretation have limited effect against
such a sweeping power as plenary power. For instance, Congress's response
after St. Cyr was to pass legislation that explicitly used the words "habeas
corpus" to strip federal courts of their habeas jurisdiction. See REAL ID Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 301-11 (amending INA § 242, 8
U.S.C. § 252 (2000)).
85. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889).
86. 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 366, 397 (1971) (holding that state laws conditioning welfare benefits on
citizenship or length of residency violate equal protection).
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When Congress has denied benefits to aliens that it grants to
citizens, it has had to justify its denial by articulating an immi-
gration purpose in order to avoid heightened scrutiny on an
equal protection challenge. For example, in Mathews v. Diaz,
the Supreme Court upheld a statute that conditioned Medicare
eligibility for aliens on a five-year continuous residence and
green card status.8 7 In upholding the statute, the Court applied
a deferential standard of review by framing the case as one
about immigration.88 If Congress could not restrict public wel-
fare and medical benefits, the Court reasoned, its obligation to
provide benefits to aliens would hamper its ability to respond to
international economic and political crises in ways that might
affect the number of refugees coming to the United States.8 9
The issue of providing welfare benefits to aliens was therefore
an immigration issue, because it could affect Congress's ability
to provide for the admission of certain categories of immi-
grants.
Although the Court has applied the plenary power doctrine
in cases where the government has successfully argued that a
law fell within the broad category of immigration-related regu-
lation, the Court has never given Congress carte blanche to
characterize just any law as an immigration law.90 Indeed, in
determining whether a congressional action falls under the
immigration power, courts look to the connection between the
action and the United States' relation to foreign powers, since
sovereignty is at the core of the plenary power doctrine. For ex-
ample, in Gebin v. Mineta, a court held that strict scrutiny
would apply to a challenge brought by a U.S. national to a post-
September 11 law that made U.S. citizenship a requirement to
be an airport screener. 91 Distinguishing Diaz, the court held
that the restriction could not be considered an immigration
law, because it could have no implication in relations with for-
87. 426 U.S. 67, 69, 87 (1976).
88. See id. at 77-84.
89. See id. at 81.
90. In other contexts, Congress's powers have been limited to actions that
are tied to the substance of the power in question. For instance, in United
States v. Morrison and United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down
laws not related to interstate commerce. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-20
(2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995); cf. Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax
Code as Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 407-23 (2006) (arguing
that a federal law making noncitizens pay federal taxes under nationality law
on their worldwide income is beyond Congress's tax power).
91. 231 F. Supp. 2d 971, 976 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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eign powers, nor could it be justified as encouraging aliens to
naturalize. 92 The reasons behind the plenary power doctrine
matter in determining whether a law falls within it.
The Supreme Court has also found limits to the plenary
power doctrine when Congress exceeds its structural constitu-
tional authority. For example, in INS v. Chadha, the Court in-
validated a law that allowed a single house of Congress to veto
the Attorney General's decision to allow an alien to remain in
the United States. 93 The Court invalidated the statute despite
the existence of the plenary power doctrine because the exer-
cise of the power offended another constitutional restriction-in
that case, separation of powers. 94 Family law, of course, pre-
sents a different structural issue, one of federalism, but one
that could result in the same class of exceptions to the plenary
power doctrine.
Immigration law thus places Congress and those it regu-
lates in an unusual position. Congress has atypically broad
power to regulate in the immigration area, and even if that
regulation happens to regulate marriage, the usual prohibition
against congressional involvement in family law does not apply.
At the same time, family law-the law that says who may
marry, what spousal obligations exist, and sets the terms for
divorce-is one area that is clearly beyond any of Congress's
enumerated powers and lies, rather, within the powers tradi-
tionally granted to the states. And, as discussed below in Part
II.A, Congress has a special interest in using its power over
immigration to unify families because it believes that family
members of U.S. citizens and residents make for especially de-
sirable immigrants. The question that needs to be answered
about congressional regulation of marriage through immigra-
tion law is whether the regulation is actually tied to a legiti-
mate immigration purpose. If it is, the regulation may be
within Congress's power to effect, even if it does have the unin-
tended or unavoidable side effect of regulating marriage. But if
it does not-if the law in question has nothing to do with the
92. See id. Consider also Justice O'Connor's dissent in Nguyen v. INS, dis-
cussed above: "[A] predicate for application of the deference commanded by
Fiallo is that the individuals concerned be aliens." 533 U.S. 53, 96 (2001)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In other words, plenary power deference applies
only where immigration is the subject in question; if the question is instead
one of citizenship, then the normal constitutional standards would apply.
93. 462 U.S. 919, 923, 959 (1983).
94. See id. at 944-51.
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exclusion of immigrants or the deportation of immigrants, but
instead regulates the lives of citizens-then the plenary power
doctrine may not apply at all, and Congress may be overstep-
ping its bounds. 95
The next several parts of this Article delve more deeply
into specific immigration laws that affect marriage to show that
federal intervention in this area is often more extensive than,
and different from, state family law. To show this contrast, I
work through each of the four stages of marriage, considering
at each stage how immigration law differs from the default
rules of family law as it regulates marriage. In doing so, I also
consider how well the immigration laws are fulfilling their os-
tensible purpose of regulating immigration, including the policy
of family unification. As I consider each of the four stages, three
types of laws emerge. Some immigration laws regulate mar-
riage only inadvertently: like the admissions categories de-
scribed above, they are primarily intended to regulate immigra-
tion, but in the process they sometimes explicitly deviate from
state law definitions of family. Others more explicitly regulate
marriage, but do so because of problems that are created by
immigration law itself. Still others serve no immigration pur-
pose, or serve one only tangentially, and instead aim to inter-
vene substantively in marriage. Given these differences, in as-
sessing whether an immigration law regulation of marriage is
legitimate, we need to consider whether the exercise of power
serves an immigration purpose.
II. REGULATING COURTSHIP
A. FAMILY LAW AND COURTSHIP
Of the four stages of marriage, courtship is currently the
least regulated. If Joe meets Susanna on the Internet, or at a
bar, or through friends, the state has nothing to say about the
substance of their relationship until they seek a marriage li-
cense.
95. Courts have been quite unfriendly to claims by citizens that they are
harmed by immigration law. For example, the claim that citizens are harmed
when their undocumented parents are deported has not received constitu-
tional protection. But it would be another case if a law targeted citizens, as do
some of the laws this Article explores. See, e.g., infra Part II.B.2 (discussing
the International Marriage Broker Regulation Act); infra Part V.B (discussing
the affidavit of support requirement).
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This was not always so. Nineteenth-century common law
was quite concerned with courtship. It regulated courtship
through several means: the tort of seduction, 96 claims for
breach of promise to marry,97 and statutes criminalizing forni-
cation. 98 Each of these rules had a moral valence: sex and re-
production were supposed to occur during marriage, and engag-
ing in sexual activity outside of marriage or reducing a
woman's chances of marriage by "ruining"' her were both of-
fenses against her and her father.
Since puritan times, states have made fornication (sex out-
side of marriage) a crime. These laws were rarely enforced with
vigor, but they were available as leverage to force marriages
between couples who had engaged in premarital sex that re-
sulted in a pregnancy. 99
In the twentieth century, claims for breach of promise to
marry, the tort of seduction, and fornication decreased and
were eventually invalidated by courts. As women became more
economically self-sufficient and a woman's loss of virginity be-
fore marriage became less stigmatized, there was no longer any
reason in market terms to compensate women for what increas-
ingly came to be viewed as merely "personal" losses. 100 The fi-
nal death knell on fornication bans occurred with the Supreme
Court's 2003 Lawrence v. Texas decision. l0 1 Under Lawrence,
the state cannot criminalize private, consensual, homosexual
behavior. 0 2 As a result, courts have held that the state cannot
criminalize private, consensual heterosexual behavior either. 0 3
96. For a discussion of the tort of seduction, see Jane E. Larson, "Women
Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature "Deceit"" A Feminist Rethink-
ing of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 381-401 (1993).
97. These lawsuits were almost always brought by women. LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES 61 (2004) (noting that women constituted ninety-
seven percent of the plaintiffs in English cases, and that the few men who
sued usually lost). The underlying theory was that a woman had given up her
virginity or her chances in the marriage market and was therefore entitled to
money damages. Id.
98. See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 368 (Va. 2005).
99. See id.
100. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 203,
211-13 (1990).
101. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
102. See id. at 578.
103. See Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 368, 371 (striking down Virginia's fornica-
tion law where a man asserted an "unclean hands" defense to a claim by his
girlfriend that he knowingly gave her herpes).
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States, then, have ceased to directly regulate courtship by
permitting money damages for seduction or breach of promise
to marry or criminalizing extramarital sex. Of course, there are
still legal incentives to marry: access to a spouse's insurance
policy or other employee benefits, the desire to legitimate chil-
dren, and the benefits of economies of scale can all induce peo-
ple to marry who otherwise would not. Furthermore, several
scholars have shown that states encourage the poor and people
of color to enter into marriage to prevent dependency on wel-
fare, despite the negative effects marriage can have in certain
cases.104 But the high rates of extramarital cohabitation occur-
ring today indicate that these pressures, while real, no longer
make marriage the only game in town. 105
The one way in which states continue to regulate courtship
is through time limits associated with marriage licenses. Some
states impose waiting periods from the date a license is ob-
tained until the date the marriage ceremony can occur. Nevada
is notorious as a state where one can marry on a whim, 106 but
some other states require couples to wait up to five days after
obtaining a license.'0 7 These laws prevent couples from marry-
ing suddenly and with little forethought, essentially forcing
couples to have a courtship-even if it lasts only a few days.
Another feature of state licensure law that affects court-
ship is the time limit that a license is valid. Most state mar-
riage licenses become invalid after a certain amount of time if
the couple does not marry. This time limit varies from as little
104. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 222-26
(1996); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 12, at 1673-82.
105. See, e.g., Anne Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1381, 1387 (2001) (describing the increasing prevalence of nonmarital
cohabitation); Sharon Jayson, Divorce Declining, but So Is Marriage, USA TO-
DAY, July 18, 2005, at A3.
106. See Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and Interstate Rec-
ognition of Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 83, 88 (1998).
107. Minnesota and Wisconsin both have five-day waiting periods. MINN.
STAT. § 517.08, subdiv. lb(a) (2006); WIS. STAT. § 765.08 (2007). Alaska, the
District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington all have
three-day waiting periods. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.091 (2006); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 46-409 (LexisNexis 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.4 (West 2001); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:241 (2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 19 (LexisNexis 2003);
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 551.103a (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(b)
(2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.040 (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.077
(West 2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303 (West 2001); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 2.204 (Vernon 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.180 (West 2005).
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at ten days in Oklahoma to one year in Arizona; 108 Mississippi,
New Mexico, and Wisconsin issue licenses that last indefi-
nitely. 109 A major reason for the time limit may be that states
get valuable license fees each time a person applies for a new
license. 110 But an effect of the law may be that couples think
carefully about when to apply for a license, because failing to
time the acquisition of the license properly might lead to paying
for the license twice. The effect of these state license laws on
courtship, however, is fairly insignificant.
B. IMMIGRATION LAW AND COURTSHIP
In contrast to the laissez-faire attitude of state family law,
immigration law intervenes substantially in courtship in two
ways: by creating a special category of "fianc6 visas" and by
mandating disclosures of criminal and marital background for
some couples.
1. Fianc6 Visas
Immigration law regulates courtship through the use of so-
called fianc6 or K-1 visas."'i A fianc6 visa allows an immigrant
to enter the United States for up to ninety days for the purpose
of marrying a U.S. citizen. 112 Fiance visas allow cross-national
couples to marry within the United States and also provide a
means for couples who intend to marry but need more court-
ship time in the same geographic location together. Interest-
ingly, the annual number of fianc6 visa applications has risen
sharply in the past few years. In 1995, 7,793 visa petitions
were approved for fianc6s, with an additional 768 approved for
their children.1 13 By 2004, Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) approvals nearly quadrupled to 28,546 fianc6 visa peti-
tions annually, with an additional 4,515 children.1 4 Part of the
108. ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-121(B) (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 36
(2005).
109. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-1-5, -13, -15, -18; N.M. STAT. §§ 40-1-10, -14
(2006); WIS. STAT. § 765.06, .08.
110. See, e.g., County Looks to Newlyweds, Cat Owners as Fund Sources,
L.A. TIMES (Ventura County ed.), June 18, 1996, at B1 (noting that an in-
crease in marriage license fees from $50 to $66 would increase revenues for
Ventura County, California by $50,000 per year).
111. INA § 101(a)(15)(K)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i) (2000).
112. Id.
113. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2004
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102 (2006).
114. Id. at 104.
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reason for this upswing may be the increased popularity of in-
ternational Internet dating. 115
Fianc6 visas are only approved if the parties can show that
they have "previously met in person within 2 years before the
date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry,
and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid
marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days
after the alien's arrival."116 The immigration rationales behind
these provisions are easy to imagine. Congress could reasona-
bly believe that a person who has never met his or her fianc6
(because the marriage was arranged by a matchmaker or over
the Internet), or who has not seen his or her intended in sev-
eral years, is less likely to agree to marry the U.S. citizen once
he or she arrives on the K-1 visa. Congress might not want to
waste scarce resources on issuing fianc6 visas to couples who
are less likely to marry. Congress might also be concerned that
those couples who have never met or have not met recently are
more likely to use the K-1 visa as a means of entry into the
country with an intention to overstay the visa and remain in
the country illegally, or to otherwise commit immigration fraud
of some kind. It might also believe that, even if a K-1 visa
holder does marry after arrival in the United States, marriages
based on relationships that involved little personal contact be-
fore the engagement might be less likely to survive and thus
would provide less economic and social stability for the immi-
grant.117
The requirement that a fianc6 visa-holder marry his or her
U.S. citizen sponsor within ninety days or depart the country
115. See Robert J. Scholes, The 'Mail-Order Bride"Industry and Its Impact
on U.S. Immigration, in INTERNATIONAL MATCHMAKING ORGANIZATIONS: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS app. A, at 1-6 (1999), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
files/article/Mobreptjfull.pdf (attributing the growth of marriages facilitated
through international marriage brokers to the growth of e-mail "pen-pal" clubs
and Internet-based services).
116. INA § 214(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d)(1).
117. See H.R. REP. No. 99-906, at 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5978, 5983 (calling the personal meeting requirement a "reasonable limita-
tion"); H.R. REP. No. 91-851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2757
("[The amendment] provides safeguards against abuse of the nonimmigrant
fiancde section by requiring ... the alien fianc6 [to] be the subject of a petition
approved by the Attorney General after he is satisfied as to the bona fides of
the parties and their ability legally to conclude the marriage."); S. REP. NO.
81-210 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1220, 1221 (declaring that the
parties must "actually have met" and permitting adjustment of status only for
an alien who marries the "fianc6 or fianc6e to whom the alien was destined at
the time of entry" within ninety days).
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also serves an immigration law function by preventing immi-
grants from using the K-1 visa as a substitute for long-term
permanent resident status. At times, this requirement may re-
sult in unintended consequences for courtship. In some cases,
fianc6 visas are issued to a member of a couple that has known
each other for years and the ninety-day trip to the United
States before the wedding is the culmination of a much longer
courtship. But in many cases (where, for example, the couple
meets over the Internet or while an American is abroad on
business or vacation), the fianc6 visa is sought after very few
meetings (or even only one meeting) between potential spouses.
And in some cases, partners may have known each other for a
long time, but may still be uncertain after ninety days of living
in the same place that they are ready to marry. In these latter
examples, the ninety-day rule provides very little time for the
couple to make an important life decision. For couples who do
not know each other well at the beginning of the process, three
months may give them far too little information to make an
educated choice about marriage. 118
Through the fianc6 visa restrictions, immigration law pro-
vides different incentives during courtship than state family
law does. Under state family law, marriage licenses generally
have time limits, but the penalty for failing to marry within the
allotted time is standing in line for another marriage license,
not being sent halfway around the world away from one's fu-
ture spouse. Where state law focuses on access to marriage as
an institution and has crafted rules that encourage some modi-
cum of forethought (varying by state), immigration law is fo-
cused not on regulating access to marriage for marriage's sake
but instead on fraud prevention and the allocation of scarce re-
sources. These different focuses result in markedly different
rules regulating the timing of marriage.
118. Since a K-1 visa is technically only for fianc6s-people who have al-
ready made the decision to marry but have not yet married-and not potential
fianc6s, the proper course of action for someone who is just getting to know
someone better would be to have the person come in on a B-1 tourist visa and
then return on a K-1 visa once the couple has made the decision to marry. This
strategy, however, is not one advocated by international matchmaking organi-
zations, most likely because the back and forth travel might be prohibitively
expensive.
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2. The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act
So far this Article has discussed laws that indirectly affect
courtship by making marital status a prerequisite to immigra-
tion status and by allowing fianc6s only a short time to benefit
from a fianc6 visa before a marriage is required to occur. But
one immigration law actually regulates some citizen-immigrant
courtships directly. The International Marriage Broker Regula-
tion Act of 2005 (IMBRA) regulates courtships that occur be-
tween U.S. citizens or residents and foreigners over the Inter-
net.119
Congress passed IMBRA several years after two "mail-
order brides" were murdered by their U.S. citizen husbands in
Washington State. 120 In one of the cases, the husband had pre-
viously been married to another Russian woman whom he met
through an international matchmaking organization and was
looking for a third "mail-order bride" when he murdered his
second wife.121 The murders received extensive media attention
and led to legislation in Washington State as well as the push
for IMBRA. Advocates for the legislation pointed to the market-
ing techniques used by international matchmaking websites as
evidence that the relationships resulting from these services
were more likely than others to result in violence. As Leslye Or-
119. Pub. L. No. 109-162, 199 Stat. 3066 (2006) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1375a).
120. See Press Release, Rep. Rick Larsen, Bipartisan Legislators Restart
Clock to Protect "Mail-Order Brides" (Sept. 6, 2005), http://www.house.gov/
list/press/wa02 larsenlpr_09062005_mailorder.html. I use quotation marks
around the phrase "mail-order brides" because it is misleading, but it is the
term most people use to describe foreign women who advertise themselves in
catalogues or on websites as interested in marriage to U.S. citizens. The term
is misleading because it is impossible under U.S. law to actually get a spouse
through the mail. Couples generally must meet in person in order to obtain
immigration status through marriage. The only function websites and cata-
logues serve is providing contact information, photographs, and biographical
information about potential mates. The couple must meet on their own to de-
termine whether they are compatible. The phrase "mail-order bride" is also
misleading because it implies that the husband buys his wife. Although men
who use these services must pay for access to phone numbers or e-mail ad-
dresses (which is also true of any Internet dating site, such as Match.com and
J-date), and although making a trip to a potential wife's home country to meet
her may be expensive, he makes no actual payment to a third party in ex-
change for a wife.
121. See David Fisher, Indle King Found Guilty of Killing Mail-Order
Bride, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 22, 2002, http://seattlepi.nwsource
.com/localI59387_king22.shtml; Mail Order Bride Bill in Works, CBS NEWS,
July 5, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/05/politics/main561828
.shtml.
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loff, director of the NOW Legal Defense Fund Immigrant
Women's Project 122 stated, 'They market to the women the im-
age of wealthy American men and a better life. They market to
the American men the image of docile women they can con-
trol."1 23 While the data are still scant, some studies have shown
that men who use international matchmaking websites tend to
be middle-aged, divorced, seeking marriage to a much younger
woman, and hostile to feminism. 124
IMBRA was sponsored by a bipartisan coalition including
Senator Maria Cantwell, a Democrat from Washington, and
Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican from Kansas. The re-
sulting legislation intervenes in the international matchmaking
process and also intervenes in the courtships of all U.S. citizens
who sponsor their fiances using a K-1 visa. First, it requires
U.S. citizens or residents who use international matchmaking
organizations to disclose information about themselves before
any contact with the foreign person in question can occur. Sec-
ond, it requires all sponsors of K-1 visa-holders to disclose their
own criminal history on their visa petitions. Finally, the legis-
lation imposes limitations on the number of fianc6 visas for
which an American may petition.
a. Disclosures to International Matchmaking Organizations
The first disclosure provision of IMBRA is a requirement
that international matchmaking companies gather and dis-
seminate information about the U.S. citizen or resident to DHS
and the potential foreign fianc: before any contact occurs be-
tween the potential mates. This information is quite extensive.
First, the company must, on its own, conduct a search of sex of-
fender public registries. 125 Then, it must obtain a signed certifi-
cation from the U.S. client accompanied by documentation of
his criminal history, including any arrests related to controlled
substances or alcohol.' 26 Additionally, the U.S. client must pro-
122. In 2004, NOW was renamed Legal Momentum. Legal Momentum:
About Us, httpl/legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/aboutus/legaLmomentums_
history (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
123. See Mail Order Bride Bill in Works, supra note 121.
124. Cf. Scholes, supra note 115, at 4 (describing the demographics of men
who are interested in "mail-order brides").
125. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1375a(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2006).
126. Id. § 1375a(d)(2)(B). I use the pronoun he here because Internet-based
international matchmaking organizations are almost exclusively marketed to
men in wealthy countries like the United States and to women in poorer coun-
tries, so the likelihood of a U.S. citizen woman finding a husband using an in-
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vide information about his personal history, including how
many previous marriages were terminated and the dates of the
terminations, whether the client has previously sponsored an
alien to whom he was engaged or married, the ages of his minor
children, and all states and countries in which he has resided
since he was eighteen years old.127
Under IMBRA, international matchmaking companies are
now prohibited from giving their foreign clients' contact infor-
mation to U.S. clients until after they have performed the sex-
ual offender registry search, collected the information described
above, given the information to the foreign client, and obtained
the foreign client's written consent to release her contact in-
formation. 128 Violation of the law carries substantial civil and
criminal penalties.129 And if a couple proceeds with a courtship
through an international matchmaking organization without
following the rules, the foreign fianc6 may subsequently be de-
nied a visa.130
ternational matchmaking website is exceedingly small. There appear to be no
"mail-order husband" websites geared to American women. The only one that
comes up in a search on the Internet is a joke: mailorderhusbands.net has pic-
tures and descriptions of 'losers" who cannot understand why they have not
been able to find a woman who will take them. MailOrderHusbands.Net:
Internet Matrimony-Propose Today!, http://mailorderhusbands.net (last vis-
ited Apr. 23, 2007). Moreover, although IMBRA itself is gender neutral, it is
clear from its legislative history that Congress was concerned with abuse of
foreign women by U.S. men, not the converse.
127. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1375a(d)(2)(B). The law also requires DHS to provide an
informational pamphlet to fianc6 visa-holders on the legal rights of and re-
sources available for immigrant victims of domestic violence. The pamphlet
must include information about domestic violence and sexual assault hotlines;
the illegality of domestic violence, sexual assault, and child abuse in the
United States; the visa application process and marriage-based immigration
process, including information about the consequences of marriage fraud; and
a warning "concerning the potential use of [fianc6 visas] by U.S. citizens who
have a history of committing domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse, or
other crimes and an explanation that such acts may not have resulted in a
criminal record for a citizen." Id. § 1375a(a).
128. Id. § 1375a(d)(3).
129. Id. § 1375a(d)(5)(A) (subjecting violators to civil penalties of $5,000 to
$25,000 for each violation); id. § 1375a(d)(5)(B) (providing a criminal fine and
imprisonment for no more than five years).
130. See id. § 1375a(b)(1)(c) (requiring consular officers to ask all K-1 ap-
plicants whether an international marriage broker has facilitated the relation-
ship between the applicant and the U.S. petitioner, and, if so, to obtain the
identity of the international marriage broker from the applicant and confirm
that the international marriage broker provided to the applicant the informa-
tion obtained through sex offender registry searches, criminal background
checks, and other background information). The requirement that consular
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This disclosure provision attempts to ensure that the fe-
male party in a long-distance courtship will have a substantial
amount of information about her potential American spouse at
the very first stage of the courtship-when she is deciding
whether to make his acquaintance over e-mail. The underlying
assumption appears to be that, armed with the proper informa-
tion, women can make more educated choices about whom to
date and will be less likely to find themselves in abusive rela-
tionships. 131
The disclosure requirement is limited to only those organi-
zations that explicitly target foreign women for marriage with
American men. IMBRA limits the definition of "International
Marriage Broker" to prevent the application of the law to two
subgroups: domestic matchmaking organizations and nonprofit
"cultural or religious" organizations. 132 This definition is worth
exploring, because it can help to illuminate the immigration
law purpose that Congress may have had in mind in passing
IMBRA.
The first exemption, what I call the "Match.com exemp-
tion," applies to any
entity that provides dating services if its principal business is not to
provide international dating services between United States citizens
or United States residents and foreign nationals and it charges com-
parable rates and offers comparable services to all individuals it
serves regardless of the individual's gender or country of citizen-
ship.133
This exemption essentially requires two showings: that the
business's principal purpose is not facilitating international
dating and that it charges comparable rates to men and
women.134 The first requirement, that the entity's principal
officers ask K-1 applicants about their use of marriage brokers may be a way
of sidestepping the problem of regulating non-U.S.-based matchmaking or-
ganizations by denying visas to the organizations' clients on the basis of non-
compliance.
131. See 151 CONG. REC. S13,752 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Brownback) ("A simple but incredibly powerful premise drives these pro-
visions: that this information can help a woman help herself, help her save
herself or her child from becoming the next victim of a predatory abuser.
Through this information and other safeguards, this important legislation will
help prevent those intent on doing women harm from perverting and subvert-
ing both the institution of marriage and the immigration process to find new
victims overseas.").
132. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1375a(e)(4)(B).
133. Id. § 1375a(e)(4)(B)(ii).
134. See id.
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business is not to provide international dating services, may
seek to exclude activity that is likely to have no or only a tan-
gential immigration effect. Congress may have believed that
regulating international matchmaking organizations fell within
its immigration power, while regulating domestic matchmaking
organizations did not. The second requirement, that the entity
charge comparable rates to men and women, appears to be a
means of directly targeting "mail-order bride" websites. Al-
though "mail-order bride" websites typically charge men sub-
scription fees for access to contact information, they do not
charge the women who advertise on them (who often come from
impoverished countries where a subscription fee would be pro-
hibitive). 3 5 Internet dating sites like Match.com, on the other
hand, charge users based on the access privileges they want to
have: it is often free to post a profile and look at other people's
profiles, but it costs a certain amount of money per month to
have access to the e-mail addresses of other subscribers. 136 If
Congress believed that men seek out wives from poorer coun-
tries to target them for abuse or subjugation and that a wealth
disparity between husband and wife would be likely to lead to
that abuse, it might have wanted to target only those compa-
nies that encourage use by wealthy men and poor women. 137
The second exclusion, the one that I call the "cultural ex-
clusion," applies to "a traditional matchmaking organization of
a cultural or religious nature that operates on a nonprofit ba-
135. See, e.g., Elena's Models, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www
.elenasmodels.comlfaq/index.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2007) (noting that plac-
ing ads is free for both men and women-the only charges are for accessing a
woman's contact information and for receiving a weekly catalog featuring the
women who joined within the previous month); Elena's Models, Membership
Plans, http://www.elenasmodels.com/services/membership.htm (last visited
Apr. 23, 2007).
136. See, e.g., Eharmony.com, Membership Options, http://www.eharmony
.comsingles/servlet/about/membership (last visited Apr. 23, 2007); Match.com,
Terms of Use Agreement, http://www.match.comregistration/membagr.aspx
?lid=108 (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
137. An immediate result of IMBRA appears to be the rechanneling of the
"mail-order bride" business to websites that meet the requirements of the
Match.com exception. For instance, one anti-IMBRA website,
InternationalMarriageBrokers.org, encourages users to "Meet Latin Girls and
Asian Women Exempt From the International Marriage Broker Act!" Inter-
nationalMarriageBrokers.org, Victory Against IMBRA, http://www
.internationalmarriagebrokers.org/index29.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
The links take users to AsianFriendFinder.com and Amigos.com, which are
essentially ethnically-oriented websites without an explicit "mail-order bride"
focus. See id.
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sis." 138 For example, a white U.S. citizen in search of a South
Asian wife on a "mail-order bride" website would have to make
the required disclosures in order to obtain her e-mail address,
but a U.S. citizen of South Asian descent who seeks a South
Asian wife for cultural or religious reasons and uses an Inter-
net matchmaking company that specializes in these relation-
ships and is set up as a nonprofit organization would not have
to make these disclosures.
Here, it is difficult to ascertain why Congress created an
exception. There are two distinctions operating: a cultural one
and an economic one. It is unclear what Congress meant by
"cultural"; perhaps it is using culture as a euphemistic proxy
for race or national origin because those categories would be
constitutionally problematic. There are several Internet web-
sites that specialize in helping people to meet friends, lovers, or
potential spouses of the same race or national origin. 139 But if
Congress's purpose is to prevent violent relationships, one
might ask whether a South Asian-American man who seeks a
South Asian woman because he wants a "traditional" wife is po-
tentially less violent than a white American who does the same
thing.140 The economic distinction is a bit easier to understand.
In one lawsuit challenging IMBRA, a federal district court
found that the government's argument that "men who pay for
access to a foreign bride harbor a heightened sense of owner-
ship that leads to potentially higher rates of abuse" had
merit. 141
Read in light of the Match.com exemption and the cultural
exemption, the regulation of international matchmaking or-
138. 8 U.S.C.A § 1375a(e)(4)(B)(i).
139. See, e.g., Indiamatch.com, http://www.indiamatch.com (last visited
Apr. 23, 2007); Indya.com, Dating-Online Dating for Indian Singles, http://
dating.indya.com/index.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2007); NA Media, Fili-
pinofriend.com, http://www.filipinofriend.com (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
140. Indeed, some scholars have argued that marriages between natural-
ized citizen men and women from the men's countries of origin result in the
same kinds of power imbalances and misunderstandings as experienced by
couples who meet on "mail-order bride" websites. See, e.g., Hung Cam Thai,
Clashing Dreams: Highly Educated Overseas Brides and Low-Wage U.S. Hus-
bands, in GLOBAL WOMAN: NANNIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW
ECONOMY 230, 230-53 (Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Hochschild eds., 2002).
141. European Connections & Tours v. Gonzales, No. No. 1:06-cv-00426-
CC, 2007 WL 949750, at *25 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007) (denying the plaintiff's
request for a restraining order against the enforcement of IMBRA); Am.
Online Dating Ass'n v. Gonzales, No. 3:06-cv-123 (S.D. Ohio May 25, 2006)
(order denying the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order).
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ganizations undertaken in IMBRA appears to have a more
tenuous link to immigration regulation than the other laws dis-
cussed so far. Immigration law usually regulates the immi-
grant, not the citizen-sponsor. Family members of U.S. citizens
are particularly favored because we care about citizens' free-
dom to marry and to be united with their family members and
because we believe that immigrants with family here are more
likely to become stable and productive citizens. And the re-
quirement that the U.S. citizen spouse choose to sponsor the
immigrant further supports the goal of giving citizens the free-
dom to order their private lives.
IMBRA, however, turns the usual structure of immigration
regulation on its head. Rather than regulating the immigrant,
IMBRA regulates the citizen-sponsor. Granted, this regulation
has an impact on the immigrant. Requiring citizens to disclose
their criminal background history and marital history to poten-
tial immigrants before they initiate contact might result in
some people not immigrating to the United States as spouses of
those particular citizens. If the relationship was likely to be un-
successful, then the policy justifications underlying family uni-
fication have been successfully met: this particular immigrant,
married to this particular person, was unlikely to become a
stable member of society because the marriage upon which the
immigrant's entr6e into U.S. society was premised was faulty
from the start.
Still, even if one could divine an immigration purpose from
the law, in good part the law appears to be attempting to regu-
late something other than immigration itself, namely violence
within the family. IMBRA was passed as part of the Violence
against Women Act of 2005.142 The act's main goal appears to
be the prevention of family violence by reducing the likelihood
of marriages between men likely to commit acts of family vio-
lence and women who may be vulnerable to that violence. 143
142. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization
Act of 2005 (VAWA 2005), Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
143. Indeed, the press releases issued by the House bill's cosponsor, Repre-
sentative Rick Larsen, framed it not as immigration legislation, but as a pro-
phylactic measure against a "growing nationwide trend of abuse" and a regu-
lation of international human trafficking. Press Release, Rick Larsen, House
Passes Major Provisions of Larsen's Mail-Order Bride Bill (Sept. 28, 2005),
http://www.house.gov/list/press/wa02_larsen/pr_09282005_mailorderbill.html;
see also Press Release, Rick Larsen, Rep. Larsen Takes Part in Briefing for
Congress on "Mail-Order Bride" Bill (Oct. 5, 2005), http://www.house.gov/
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The women's immigrant status may make them particularly
vulnerable: they may lack language skills, cultural knowledge,
and social networks that could enable them to get help once
violence begins. 144 But ultimately, Congress's target appears to
have been regulation of courtship dynamics and prevention of
family violence, not immigration.
b. Visa Application Disclosures
IMBRA's second disclosure requirement applies not only to
those U.S. citizens who use international matchmaking organi-
zations to find spouses, but also to any U.S. citizen who seeks
to sponsor a fianc6 using a K-1 fianc6 visa. Before IMBRA was
passed, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) required a
petition for a fianc6 visa to include "such information as the At-
torney General shall prescribe."145 Now, Congress has further
specified what this information must include: "information on
any criminal convictions of the petitioner for any specified
crime." 146 The list of "specified crimes" is fairly broad: it in-
cludes, for example "domestic violence," "abusive sexual con-
tact," "stalking," and "any Federal, state, or local arrest or con-
viction" for "offenses relating to controlled substances or
alcohol."'147 Congress appears to have specifically designed the
list of crimes to get at individuals who have a history of domes-
tic violence or activities, such as alcohol abuse, that the law's
drafters believed to be correlated with domestic violence.
Despite its passage as part of a bill targeting "mail-order
bride" websites, the criminal background disclosure portion of
the law applies to all U.S. citizens who sponsor fianc6s for K-1
list/press/wa02_larsen/pr_10052005-mailorderbridebill.html. Senator Maria
Cantwell, cosponsor of the Senate bill, identified a domestic violence problem,
not an immigration problem: "Many of these matches result in happy, long un-
ions, but there is a growing epidemic of domestic abuse among couples who
meet through a broker." Press Release, Maria Cantwell, Cantwell Bill to Pro-
tect Mail Order Brides Clears Important Hurdle (Sept. 9, 2005), http://
cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=245436&. She further argued for a
regulation of courtship: "Unfortunately, women meeting their husbands
through brokers frequently have little opportunity to get to know their pro-
spective spouses or assess their potential for violence." Press Release, Maria
Cantwell, Cantwell to Senate Committee Today: End Mail Order Bride Abuse
(July 13, 2004), http://cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=242451& [here-
inafter Cantwell Testimony].
144. See Cantwell Testimony, supra note 143.
145. INA § 214(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (2000).
146. VAWA 2005 § 832(a)(2), 119 Stat. at 3066-67.
147. Id.
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visas, including women and the many men who did not use
these websites to meet their mates. The law's most substantial
effect since its implementation in March 2006 has been to put a
hold on thousands of fianc6 visa applications that do not in-
volve international matchmaking organizations at all, but
which were prepared before the law was passed and do not in-
clude the required criminal background disclosures. 148 Here,
the (possibly unintentional) effect of IMBRA is to intervene in
any transnational courtship that culminates in the application
for a fianc6 visa by making certain that the foreign fianc6 is
aware of the American's criminal background before the foreign
fianc6 travels to the United States.
Like the required disclosures to international matchmak-
ing organizations discussed above, this provision is striking be-
cause it requires a U.S. citizen to disclose extensive information
in the immigration process for the benefit of the immigrant fi-
anc6. Usually, the person the government is most interested in
is the immigrant: Does she have a record of criminal convic-
tions that would make her inadmissible? Are her papers
fraudulent? Has she been vaccinated, and does she have any
communicable diseases?149 Even when the government asks for
information about the citizen sponsor, it has generally done so
to help the government assess the desirability of the immi-
grant. For example, the citizen spouse must sometimes undergo
an interview with DHS to demonstrate that a marriage to an
immigrant spouse is bona fide and the immigrant is not using
the marriage solely to gain immigration status.150 Similarly,
citizen sponsors must demonstrate their ability to support their
immigrant spouses so that the immigrants do not become a
burden to the state.151 In contrast, the IMBRA provisions are
explicitly designed to protect the immigrant from a potentially
abusive citizen spouse. If we were to consider this IMBRA pro-
vision on a spectrum of laws that clearly regulate immigration
versus those that clearly regulate the family, this provision
would be further away from the immigration end of the spec-
trum than most of what constitutes immigration law.
148. Lara Jakes Jordan, Marital Bliss on Hold for Red Tape; Foreign
Grooms, Brides Await Visas, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 2006, § 1, at 3.
149. See INA § 212(a)(1)-(2), (a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(2), (a)(6)(C).
150. See infra Part I.B.
151. See infra Part V.B.
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c. Limits on Fiancj Visas
There is one final aspect of IMBRA that is worth consider-
ing here: the provision that does away with what has been
called the "wife lottery."'152 Prior to the enactment of IMBRA,
there was no official limit to the number of fianc6 visas an indi-
vidual citizen could apply for during any particular period of
time. The new law creates a limit, although since the law is
rather poorly drafted, it is difficult to tell what the limit actu-
ally is. IMBRA states that a consular officer cannot approve a
petition for a K-1 fianc6 visa unless he or she has verified that:
"(1) the petitioner has not, previous to the pending petition, pe-
titioned [for a fianc6 visa] with respect to two or more applying
aliens and (2) if the petitioner has had such a petition previ-
ously approved, 2 years have elapsed since the filing of such
previously approved petition."'153 This could be read as a "three
strikes, you're out" type of law, where clause 1 imposes a life-
time limit of two fianc6 visas per American and clause 2 im-
poses an additional two-year waiting period between each one.
Alternatively, it could be read in a way that uses clause 2 to
modify clause 1, so that a petitioner must wait two years after
the filing of "such previous approved petition" before filing an-
other, and "such previous approved petition" refers to a second
petition as defined in clause 1.154
The law further attempts to regulate the frequency of fi-
anc6 visa applications even in cases where substantial time has
elapsed since the last application. If a citizen has filed for two
fianc6 visas in the past and they were both filed in the past ten
years, then the immigrant fianc6 will be notified of that fact
when the third petition is filed. 155 This provision may bolster
152. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
153. VAWA 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 832(a)(1), 119 Stat. 2960, 3066-67
(2006) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184).
154. According to a press release from the office of Representative Rick
Larsen, the bill's co-sponsor, the final law
[p]revents men from becoming serial petitioners for foreign fianc6es
(i.e., a U.S. client can only apply for one foreign fianc6e visa (K visa)
at a time; []imits the U.S. client to a total of three fianc6e visas [sic].
Upon application for a fourth fianc6e visa, the Department of Home-
land Security must take a closer look at the U.S. applicant).
Press Release, Rick Larsen, Larsen's Mail-Order Bride Bill Becomes Law (Jan.
5, 2006), http://www.house.gov/list/press/wa02_larsen/PR_01052006Mail
OrderBrides.html. This reading does not appear to accord with either of the
readings I offer above, nor does it seem defensible given the actual text of the
law.
155. VAWA 2005 § 832(a)(2)(B).
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the second reading of clause 1 discussed above. If there is a life-
time limit of only two fianc6 visas, why would a potential
spouse need to be alerted that a U.S. citizen's application was
for a third visa? The answer to this might be that the law in-
cludes a discretionary waiver of the two-petition limitation, so
that in many cases a third petition might actually be
granted. 156
The reason IMBRA's sponsors gave for the inclusion of a
limit on the frequency and number of fianc6 visas was what
they termed the "wife lottery."'157 Under the previous system,
an American man could conceivably apply for several fianc6 vi-
sas at once, and then marry the woman whose visa was ap-
proved first.158 But the law as actually passed does much more
than restrict the number of fianc6 visas that can be petitioned
for simultaneously. It, even on the more generous second read-
ing, also restricts the frequency with which someone can apply
for a fianc6 visa.
Where this provision of IMBRA falls on the immigration
law-family law spectrum depends in large part on which inter-
pretation of the statute courts eventually endorse. If they en-
dorse the second reading, then the law seems to be serving an
immigration purpose. Quotas are frequently applied in immi-
gration law, although they are usually annual quotas for par-
ticular categories of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, not
quotas on the number of immigrants a citizen can sponsor.
Even if the method of applying the quota seems unusual, the
purpose behind the method might serve a rational immigration
purpose. Congress could be concerned, for example, with
fraud. 159 It might suspect that citizens who sponsor multiple fi-
anc6s in a short period of time are defrauding the system by
sponsoring immigrants based on intended marriages that are
not bona fide.
If, on the other hand, courts read the statute more restric-
tively as a lifetime limit of two fiance visas, the provision is
156. See id. § 832(a)(1) (stating that DHS may waive the two-petition limi-
tation or the two-year waiting period provision if a "justification exist[s]"). Ex-
cept in "extraordinary circumstances," however, justification does not exist if
the petitioner "has a record of violent criminal offenses against a person or
persons." Id.
157. 151 CONG. REC. H8425 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Larson).
158. Id.
159. For a more extensive discussion of legislation targeting marriage
fraud, see infra Part IV.
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much more difficult to justify as an immigration regulation.
While it is possible that citizens who sponsor more than two fi-
anc6s in their lifetime are more likely to be engaging in immi-
gration fraud, it is also highly likely that large numbers of
these citizens are simply unlucky in love. Plenty of people
marry multiple times, and, especially for those who have sub-
stantial ties to another country, it would be unsurprising that
many of these relationships are international in scope. Con-
sider, for example, naturalized citizens and permanent resi-
dents who want to marry someone from their home countries
and seek spouses through family members, matchmakers, or
Internet companies. It would be unsurprising if some of these
relationships, based on a single meeting, did not survive the
ninety-day engagement period and that a prospective spouse
might try again with someone new.
In short, because of immigration policy's family unification
goals, immigration law intrudes much more extensively into
courtship than does state family law. Much of this intrusion re-
sults directly from the fact that marriage is one of our society's
fundamental organizing principles, and we use it to test
whether a couple is a "family." But some of these laws go far
beyond effecting a policy of family unification, attempting in-
stead to change the balance of power, based on gender, race, or
citizenship, in relationships involving citizens and immigrants.
When federal immigration law does this, it may be regulating
the family much more than it is regulating immigration.
III. REGULATING ENTRY INTO MARRIAGE
A. FAMILY LAW AND ENTRY
1. Formal and Functional Relationships
State family law regulates entry to marriage more heavily
than courtship. States have long been the sole arbiter of what
counts as marriage and who can get married. In the nineteenth
century, many states permitted more than one type of mar-
riage: marriage could be entered into by obtaining a license and
having the marriage solemnized in a court or church, or by co-
habitating for a number of years and holding oneselves out as
"husband and wife" to the community (i.e., common law mar-
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riage). 160 Today, most states have abolished common law mar-
riage, but many states recognize other forms of adult, romantic
relationships that have legal import.161 For example, some
states have introduced other formal statuses in addition to
marriage, such as state-sanctioned civil unions and domestic
partnerships, which give participants some of the benefits of
marriage without requiring marriage itself.162 And some state
courts honor functional family relationships by enforcing prop-
erty agreements between nonmarried partners. This recogni-
tion entitles one of the partners to continued support upon dis-
solution of the relationship, even though no marriage ever
occurred. The most famous case on this theme is Marvin v.
Marvin, where the court held that actor Lee Marvin's former
girlfriend could maintain a suit to recover the value of house-
keeping services she rendered during their relationship.
163
Cases like Marvin essentially give some of the benefits of mar-
riage-the guarantee of property distribution and the possibil-
ity of alimony-to the unmarried, and may therefore remove
some of the incentives of marriage for those who are on the
fence.' 6 4 Marriage, however, continues to provide broader
remedies upon dissolution than cohabitation. 16 5
2. Who May Marry
In addition to setting procedural marriage requirements,
states also limit the types of people who may marry each other.
Every state has a minimum age of consent to marry. 166 Every
state also prohibits marriages between parents and children,
brothers and sisters, and uncles and nieces or aunt and neph-
160. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 79 (1985). See
generally Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000).
161. LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 238 (3d ed. 2005) (listing nine
states that still recognize common law marriage and five states that have
abolished it since 1991).
162. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1204 (2002).
163. 557 P.2d 106, 122-23 (Cal. 1976).
164. See Hobbs v. Bates, 122 Wash. App. 1010, 2004 WL 1465949, at *9
(Ct. App. June 28, 2004) ("We observe that many couples are deciding to have
children outside traditional marriage relationships.").
165. See Estin, supra note 105, at 1402-03.
166. JUDITH AREEN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW 98 (5th ed.
2006) (noting that although most states designate eighteen as the age of con-
sent unless the parties obtain parental consent or a judicial override, some
states have differing ages of consent for boys and girls).
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ews, and thirty states also prohibit marriage between first
cousins. 16 7 Polygamy is also prohibited everywhere, although
there are large polygamous compounds in Utah and Arizona
that have gone relatively unregulated by the local authori-
ties. 168
Currently, the most controversial marriage restrictions are
those concerning same-sex marriage. States other than Massa-
chusetts, which allows same-sex marriage, vary in their treat-
ment of same-sex partnership. The treatment ranges from judi-
cially mandated civil unions in Vermont, 169 to legislatively
enacted civil unions in Connecticut 170 and New Jersey, 171 to
statutory or constitutional bans on same-sex unions in many
states. 17
2
Of course, because state rules vary, and because citizens
are free to move to any other state, deciding whether to recog-
nize a marriage entered into in a state with a different mar-
riage policy is a challenging legal issue. Generally, the validity
of a marriage is judged by the law of the place where it was
celebrated. 173 For example, imagine that a couple marries in a
state with no blood test requirement and later moves to an-
other state and seeks to have the marriage recognized. Since
the marriage was valid in the state where it was celebrated, it
is valid in the new state despite that state's blood test require-
ment. Determinations of validity most commonly arise when a
person seeks an annulment, a divorce, or to inherit his or her
spouse's estate.
The "valid if valid where celebrated" rule has one impor-
tant exception. In cases where the marriage violates the deeply
held public policy of a given state, then that state can invoke a
"public policy exception" to the rule of recognition. 174 Tradition-
ally, this exception was most often invoked in cases of polyg-
167. Id. at 94.
168. See JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN 5 (2003).
169. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). The Vermont legislature
later codified the decision at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
170. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38aa (West Supp. 2006).
171. New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-1 to
-13 (West Supp. 2006).
172. See Gregory M. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships
in the United States: A Social Science Perspective, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 607,
608-09 (2006).
173. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 63 (2000).
174. See New York v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (refus-
ing to recognize a polygamous marriage contracted in Nigeria).
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amy or incest. In some cases, however, particular forms of in-
cestuous marriage were not found to violate a deeply held pub-
lic policy, even if such marriages were not .permitted under the
laws of the state where they were challenged. 175 The most re-
cent invocations of the public policy exception have been in the
handful of cases refusing to recognize Massachusetts same-sex
marriages and Vermont civil unions. For example, in Lane v.
Albanese, a Connecticut court refused to recognize a Massachu-
setts same-sex marriage on the grounds that same-sex mar-
riage violated Connecticut public policy. 176 As a consequence,
the couple who married in Massachusetts could not get di-
vorced in Connecticut.
Thus, state family law has traditionally defined the ways
in which residents can enter marriage and courts have some-
times enforced these limitations by declaring marriages from
other states void for public policy reasons. Meanwhile, the fed-
eral government has avoided establishing national criteria for
entrance into marriage. Because licensing requirements have
been universally considered the province of the states, those
who would regulate marriage on the federal level have often re-
sorted to proposing amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
These amendments have universally failed.177
The passage in 1996 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) is an important exception to the general rule that
Congress does not legislate in the marriage arena. But even
DOMA does not purport to second guess states' control over
marriage requirements. DOMA merely makes the public policy
exception to the "valid-where-celebrated" rule explicit in cases
of same-sex marriage, stating that no state shall be required to
recognize "a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of [an]other State.' 78
While ostensibly preserving state autonomy by strengthening
the public policy exception, DOMA also defined "spouse," and
175. See, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(rejecting a claim that a Tennessee marriage between cousins violated Indiana
public policy).
176. 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 3, 2005 WL 896129, at *4 (Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2005).
In contrast, a Massachusetts court agreed to recognize and dissolve a Vermont
civil union. Salucco v. Alldredge, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 498, 501, 2004 WL 864459,
at *4 (Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2004).
177. See generally Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments
to the United States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611,
625-41 (2004) (giving a detailed history of the proposed amendments).
178. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
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"marriage" under federal law as referring to "a legal union be-
tween one man and one woman as husband and wife." 179 There-
fore, DOMA both encouraged states to adopt their own policies
regarding marriage (thus promoting the proliferation of contra-
dictory marriage definitions that will not transfer neatly across
state lines) and simultaneously created a uniform, federal defi-
nition that applies where the words marriage or spouse are
used in the United States Code, including in the area of immi-
gration law.
B. IMMIGRATION LAW AND ENTRY
State family law generally excludes from entry into mar-
riage those who violate very minimal requirements regarding
age, number of spouses, consanguinity, or sex of the spouse.
Immigration law, on the other hand, does not directly regulate
who may marry. A U.S. citizen can marry anyone she chooses,
so long as she comports with state licensure requirements: it is
only when she desires to bring her spouse to the United States
that U.S. immigration law comes into play. Immigration law
labels some marriages as fraudulent for immigration purposes,
even if the marriage is perfectly legal under the law of the state
or country in which it was performed. Thus, immigration law
has the power to prevent spouses from living in the same coun-
try. For many people, being able to cohabit is of paramount im-
portance to a successful marriage. The knowledge that contact
with a prospective spouse will be difficult presents a serious
impediment to marriage.
1. Formal Versus Functional Recognition of Couples
Like state family law, immigration law uses formal defini-
tions of marriage in determining who can take advantage of the
"immediate relative" and "family preference" immigration cate-
gories that enable an immigrant to obtain permanent resident
status.18 0 In the "immediate family" and "family preference"
categories, the law makes no exception for couples who are co-
habitating, or coparenting, but not married.18'
179. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
180. See supra Part I.A.
181. See INA §§ 201(b), 203(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1153(a) (2000) (provid-
ing immigration status only to legal spouses). Some countries use functional
definitions of family in deciding whether a couple counts as "married" for im-
migration purposes. See, e.g., Philip Britton, Gay and Lesbian Rights in the
United Kingdom: The Story Continued, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 207, 226
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In choosing a formal definition over a functional one, Con-
gress privileges clarity and administrability over accuracy.
However, it could just as easily have taken another approach.
One can imagine, for example, cases in which the purpose of
reuniting families would be more accurately served by reunit-
ing some couples who are not married but are nevertheless in a
committed relationship and denying immigration status to
spouses who are married but whose relationships are dysfunc-
tional or unlikely to succeed. This approach, however, would
require immigration officials to spend much more time screen-
ing couples and intrude on their privacy more extensively. 18 2
The decision to adopt a formal rather than a functional defini-
tion of marriage, therefore, serves a straightforward immigra-
tion law purpose: if we want to admit people quickly, without
unnecessary and intrusive delay, then requiring a marriage
certificate for those who would use marriage as a basis for im-
migration makes good administrative sense.' 83 The decision to
adopt a formal definition might also serve to limit the numbers
of immigrants seeking to use the immediate relative category:
if every person who was involved in a romantic relationship
with a U.S. citizen could claim immigration status based on
their relationships, we might no longer be able to provide this
status to an unlimited number of partners.
(2000) (stating that in 1997 U.K. immigration policies were changed so as to
apply equally to unmarried cohabitating same-sex and opposite-sex couples);
Sara A. Shubert, Comment, Immigration Rights for Same-Sex Partners Under
the Permanent Partners Immigration Act, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 541 (2001)
(noting that the United States does not treat unmarried cohabitating same-sex
and opposite-sex couples in the same way as the United Kingdom).
182. For an analysis of how state recognition of functional same-sex rela-
tionships imposes additional requirements on couples, see Mary Anne Case,
Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1772-74 (2005). Cf. Vivian Hamil-
ton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 307, 368
(2004) (arguing that the expressive, companionate, sexual, and reproductive
functions of marriage do not merit state intrusion).
183. In 2000, Congress rejected a proposal for a functional definition of
spouse for immigration purposes. The proposed bill, the Permanent Partners
Immigration Act, would have added the phrase "and permanent partners" af-
ter the word spouse in many sections of the INA. H.R. 3650, 106th Cong. §§ 3-
18 (2000). The proposed act would have defined a "permanent partner" as an
individual "in a committed, intimate relationship" that both partners intended
to be lifelong; who was eighteen years of age or older; financially interdepend-
ent; not already in a similar relationship or marriage; unable to contract a
marriage recognized under the INA; and not third degree or closer blood rela-
tion of the partner. Id. § 2.
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2. Who May Marry... for Immigration Purposes
Immigration law has its own prerequisites for who may en-
ter a valid marriage, which in some ways track state law and in
others supersede it. Before same-sex marriage was on the hori-
zon, issues of validity most commonly arose in cases involving
polygamy, incest, and miscegenation. In the cases involving in-
cest and miscegenation, the issue was generally whether the
public policy of the state where the couple would be domiciled
prohibited recognition of the marriage; in the polygamy cases,
the issue was whether the marriage violated federal public pol-
icy.
In re Da Silva is a prototypical incest case. In that case,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) considered whether
the marriage of a Portuguese man and his niece, entered into in
Georgia, was invalid because such a marriage could not be en-
tered into in New York, the couple's state of domicile.18 4 The
BIA found the marriage valid, because although the couple
could not have legally married in New York, the state did not
have a public policy of refusing to recognize uncle-niece mar-
riages validly entered into out of state. 8 5 In incest cases, immi-
gration judges often determine that the couple would be prose-
cuted for illegal cohabitation in the state of domicile in order to
demonstrate a "strong public policy" against the marriage. For
example, in one case the BIA stated that "[i]t is well estab-
lished that the marriage of an uncle and his niece is considered
lawful for immigration purposes if valid where performed and if
the State in which they intend to reside does not regard the co-
habitation of such persons therein as criminal."'18 6
Similarly, in cases of miscegenation, courts looked to
whether the state of domicile would criminalize mixed cohabi-
184. 15 I. & N. Dec. 778, 778-79 (1976).
185. Id. at 780.
186. In re C-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 632, 633 (B.I.A. 1952); see also In re Lieberman,
50 F. Supp. 121, 122-23 (D.C.N.Y. 1943) (granting a petition for naturaliza-
tion to a Russian woman who was invalidly married in New York to her ma-
ternal uncle and later validly remarried in Rhode Island because under New
York law marriages validly entered into in another state are valid in New
York); In re Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1967) (finding that a mar-
riage between first cousins domiciled in Wisconsin but entered into in South
Carolina was invalid for immigration purposes because such marriages are
void and subject to criminal sanction in Wisconsin); In re Hirabayashi, 10 I. &
N. Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 1964) (holding that a marriage between first cousins
was valid where entered into under Colorado law, in part because first-cousin
marriages were not criminal under Illinois law).
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tation by married couples who had validly married in a differ-
ent state. In re C-, the BIA held valid a marriage between a
Filipino man and a white woman entered into in Washington,
D.C., when the couple was domiciled in Maryland. 8 7 Maryland
would not have allowed the marriage to take place, and indeed
it would have been a crime for the couple to marry there, but
Maryland's laws did not include any language making it crimi-
nal to marry elsewhere and then return to live as husband and
wife in Maryland. 188
The inquiry has been slightly different in polygamy cases.
Rather than looking to state law for a "strong public policy"
against polygamy, courts have instead looked to federal law.
For example, in In re H-, the BIA refused to grant resident
status to the husband of a U.S. citizen. 8 9 The citizen wife was
the beneficiary husband's second wife through a marriage le-
gally entered into in Jordan. 190 After marrying the U.S. citizen
wife, the Jordanian husband divorced his first wife and was
thus only married to the U.S. citizen wife at the time she peti-
tioned for him. 191 The court deciding this petition bypassed the
question of whether a polygamous marriage would be recog-
nized in the state in which the couple planned to reside. In-
stead, it held that the federal government had a strong public
policy against polygamous marriage because Congress had
made practicing polygamists excludable under the immigration
law since 1891.192 The court gave no explanation for why it by-
passed the state law inquiry. 193 Rather, it cited Anglo-American
sources holding that a polygamous marriage "is not a marriage
as understood among the Christian nations" and emphasized
187. 7 I. & N. Dec. 108, 110-13 (B.I.A. 1956).
188. Id. at 110-11.
189. 9 I. & N. Dec. 640, 640 (B.I.A. 1962).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 640-41.
192. Id. at 642.
193. Other courts have not recognized polygamous marriage in the immi-
gration context. See, e.g., United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 266-68 (9th
Cir. 1970) (finding a marriage void for immigration purposes under Massachu-
setts law where the husband was married to another woman at the time the
marriage was celebrated); Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1927)
(holding that the daughter of a U.S. citizen, born in China of a polygamous
marriage, was not entitled to enter as a citizen because of federal policy
against polygamy); In re Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307, 307 (B.I.A. 1973) (stat-
ing that a polygamous marriage between two Jordanians validly entered into
in Israel was not valid for immigration purposes on public policy grounds).
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that the couple had been married under Muslim law in Jor-
dan.194
These two approaches to public policy-looking to state law
and looking to federal law, respectively-come together in the
context of same-sex marriage. This issue has recently become
particularly fraught, as more and more countries legalize same-
sex marriage and create a circumstance in which an aspiring
immigrant could be formally married and yet not meet DOMA's
definition of marriage.195 The issue first arose over twenty-five
years ago, before any U.S. states or foreign countries officially
allowed same-sex marriages or civil unions, in Adams v. How-
erton, a case deciding whether a resident of Boulder, Colorado
could get his partner admitted as a "spouse" under the "imme-
diate relative" admissions category. 196
The Adams court applied a two-part test: it first asked
whether the marriage was valid under state law, and then
asked "whether that state-approved marriage qualifies" under
the INA. 197 The court purported to derive this test from United
States v. Sacco, a case considering whether a bigamous mar-
riage was valid for immigration purposes. The court in that
case, however, did not ask whether a bigamous marriage was
valid under federal law. Rather, it asked whether the marriage
was valid under state law, and then whether the parties "in-
tended that the marriage be one falling within the [Supreme]
Court's definition of the common understanding of mar-
riage,"'198 or in other words, whether the couple married for love
or in a 'sham, phony, empty ceremony"' intended only to facili-
tate immigration status for one of the spouses. 199 The Adams
court took this "additional, federal, requirement"200 and trans-
194. In re H-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 641; id. at 640 (describing marriage as being
performed by "the legal mazoun of the Amman Sharia Court at Jabal el-Nasr,
Amman, Jordan" and noting that "multiple or polygamous marriages are per-
mitted among persons of the Moslem faith according to the laws of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan").
195. Same-sex marriage is currently available in Belgium, Canada, the
Netherlands, South Africa, and Spain. Jonathan Clayton, Same-Sex Marriages
Given Blessing by South Africa, TIMES (London), Dec. 2, 2005, at 47.
196. 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982).
197. Id.
198. Sacco, 428 F.2d at 270.
199. Id. at 271 (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953)).
200. Id.
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formed it into a test of whether a marriage conforms to federal
marriage policy.201
In the Adams case, the new test played out as follows.
Colorado's position on same-sex marriage was unclear.20 2 The
couple had acquired a license in Boulder, so one local actor had
deemed the marriage valid. 203 But Colorado law did not define
marriage as either including or excluding same-sex couples, 20 4
and the Colorado Attorney General had written "an informal,
unpublished opinion addressed to a member of the Colorado
legislature three days after the alleged marriage in question
occurred, [which] stated that purported marriages between per-
sons of the same sex are of no legal effect in Colorado." 205 The
ambiguity of the state law was irrelevant, however, because the
court was convinced that same-sex marriage violated federal
public policy.206 The INA did not define spouse, but the court
determined that same-sex marriage was not consistent with the
INA because 'unless otherwise defined, words will be inter-
preted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common mean-
ing."'20 7 Even if Colorado had redefined marriage for its resi-
dents, state law definitions of marriage would have no place in
determining whether these residents could use immigration
law to be with their spouses.208
Of course, now that DOMA has been enacted, the federal
stance on same-sex marriage is perfectly clear.20 9 But the same
curiosity present in Adams still exists-although states may
define the requirements for entry into marriage for their resi-
dents, when determining the validity of a marriage for immi-
gration purposes, federal definitions can supersede a state's en-
try requirements with respect to residents with foreign
spouses. Immigration law functions to alter the states' family
law definitions of marriage for purposes of who may be admit-
ted.
201. See Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038-40.
202. Id. at 1039.
203. Id. at 1038.
204. See id. at 1039.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1040 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
208. Id. at 1039.
209. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (defining the word marriage to mean "only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife").
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DHS's policy of superseding state law in matters of same-
sex marriage took an interesting turn when it was faced with
the question of the validity of transsexuals' marriages. Individ-
ual states vary in whether they recognize a marriage where one
party to the marriage has had gender reassignment surgery.2 10
The statutes of twenty-two states and the District of Columbia
allow postoperative transsexuals to change the sex listed on
their birth certificates, and another twenty states have general
provisions for amending birth certificates that contain no spe-
cific references to transsexuals. 211 Some states, either by stat-
ute or through case law, forbid any change in birth certificates
arising from sex reassignment. 212 As early as the 1970s, some
state courts recognized marriages between postoperative trans-
sexuals and a person of the (now) opposite sex.2 13
Under immigration rules for determining the validity of a
marriage, a marriage where one of the spouses is a transsexual
would be considered valid for immigration purposes if the par-
ties intended to be domiciled in a state recognizing such mar-
210. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 225-29 (Tex. App. 1999)
(reviewing the varying conclusions reached by states addressing the issue of
the validity of marriages in which one partner is a transsexual).
211. In re Oren, No. A79 761 848, 2004 WL 1167318 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2004);
In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 83-84 (Md. 2003). But see Katie D. Fletcher & Lola
Maddox, In re Marriage of Simmons: A Case for Transsexual Marriage Recog-
nition, 37 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 533, 555 (2006) (noting that the courts of Illinois, a
state listed among the twenty-two allowing changes to birth certificates, sub-
sequently determined that Illinois law did not permit such a change).
212. See, e.g., Lambda Legal, Sources of Authority to Amend Sex Designa-
tion on Birth Certificates Following Corrective Surgery, http://www
.lambdalegal.orglour-work/issues/rights-of-transgender-peoplesources-of-authority
-to-amend.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2007) (noting that although prior to Little-
ton, Texas issued new birth certificates, since Littleton "clerks [have been] re-
fusing to correct the birth certificates of individuals who have changed their
sex by surgical procedure"); cf. In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002)
(concluding that the relevant Kansas statute's plain meaning voided a mar-
riage between a postoperative female and a male and that Kansas courts were
not required to give full faith and credit to a Wisconsin court's change of the
postoperative female's birth certificate for purposes of determining the validity
of marriage).
213. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 205, 210-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1976) (holding valid a marriage between a male and a transsexual where
the transsexual, though born with male sex organs, after sex reassignment
surgery was "fully capable of sexual activity consistent with her [female] gen-
der"). But see Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (holding void a marriage between a female and postoperative female-to-
male transsexual); In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 137 (concluding that the Kansas
legislature intended to void a marriage between a male and a postoperative
male-to-female transsexual).
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riages unless this conclusion was contradicted by federal law.2 14
DHS, however, expressed concern that the application of the
general rule might lead to the federal recognition of same-sex
marriage. 215 The normal federal immigration policy classified a
person based on his or her claimed sex at the time immigration
documentation was used, so long as the gender was not rele-
vant to the petition.216 For example, a postoperative male-to-
female transsexual would be described as female on her green
card.217 In 2004, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), a division of DHS, issued a memorandum regarding
petitions filed by transsexual individuals. 218 Recognizing the
need to clarify its policies with respect to marriage petitions by
transsexuals to "ensure consistency with the legislative intent
reflected in the DOMA," USCIS set forth a policy of recognizing
only the petitioner and beneficiary's sex at birth in determining
whether a marriage is valid for immigration purposes, 219 thus
directly contradicting the usual federal practice that gender
was relevant only at the time of documentation.
Paradoxically, DHS's attempt to implement DOMA's ban
on same-sex marriage could have resulted in federal recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages. If a female-to-male postoperative
transsexual and a male married in Massachusetts, the mar-
riage would be a valid marriage regardless of whether the
transsexual individual was considered female or male. First,
the marriage would be a valid under state law, 220 one condition
DHS evaluates in determining a marriage's validity for immi-
214. See, e.g., In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 751 (B.I.A. 2005)
("[L]ong-standing case law hold[s] that there is no Federal definition of mar-
riage and that the validity of a particular marriage [for immigration purposes]
is determined by the law of the State where the marriage was celebrated.").
215. See SARAH B. IGNATIUS & ELIZABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND THE FAMILY § 4:17 (2006) (stating that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) has taken the position that DOMA requires that USCIS "not
recognize a marriage or intended marriage where one or both of the individu-
als claims to be a transsexual").
216. USCIS Instructs on Petitions, Applications Filed by or on Behalf of
Transsexuals, 81 INTERPRETER RELEASES 929, 930 (2004).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 929.
219. See Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Reg'l Dirs. (Apr. 16, 2004), in 81 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 952, 954 (2004) [hereinafter Yates Memorandum].
220. Massachusetts has recognized same-sex marriages as valid. See Good-
ridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003).
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gration purposes. 221 Second, because the transsexual individual
was a female at birth, the marriage between the transsexual
individual and the male would be recognized as valid by DHS
because the two were of the opposite sex at birth.222 Noting this
potential for "anomalous results if we refuse to recognize a
postoperative transsexual's change of sex and instead consider
the person to be of the sex determined at birth," the BIA invali-
dated the policy in 2005.223 Since the legislative history of
DOMA does not indicate that Congress intended to supersede
the BIA's long-standing policy of determining marriages' valid-
ity according to the "law of the state in which they were cele-
brated,"224 the BIA determined that DOMA did not preclude
recognition of postoperative transsexual marriages. 225
In sum, because of its requirement that a marriage is valid
only if consistent with the INA, immigration law departs from
the default entry rules of state family law. In some cases, this
departure makes little substantive difference: the federal re-
quirement that a sponsoring family member be at least eight-
een years of age, for example, comports with the age of consent
laws of most of the states. But as same-sex marriage, civil un-
ions, and domestic partnerships become increasingly available
around the globe and in some parts of the United States, the
special rules imposed by immigration law will have a more sig-
nificant impact.
As discussed previously, Congress's rationale for recogniz-
ing formal rather than functional relationships has a clear im-
migration purpose.226 But Congress's decision not to recognize
same-sex marriage and civil unions is more difficult to tie to a
legitimate immigration purpose under the plenary power doc-
trine. 227 Since relationships such as same-sex marriages, civil
unions, and domestic partnerships are formal, they might pre-
dict commitment or longevity of a relationship as effectively as
marriage. If Congress's purpose in reunifying families is based
on its belief that family ties provide immigrants with increased
221. In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 751 (B.I.A. 2005).
222. See Yates Memorandum, supra note 219, at 953.
223. In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 753 n.5.
224. Id. at 751.
225. Id. at 753. In In re Lovo-Lara, North Carolina considered a male-to-
female transsexual a female and her marriage to a male valid, leading the BIA
to also conclude that the marriage was valid for immigration purposes. Id.
226. See supra Part III.B.1.
227. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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stability and likelihood of assimilation, and on its desire to give
U.S. citizens and residents the opportunity to live with their
loved ones, recognizing same-sex marriages, civil unions, and
domestic partnerships would seem to advance this purpose.
While there may be concern that some domestic partnership
statutes do not require the same degree of commitment or con-
fer the same level of social benefits as marriage, 228 this would
not account for why same-sex marriages and civil unions, which
have identical requirements to marriage,229 would not be
recognized as valid for immigration purposes.
Congress's purpose here seems to be less one of encourag-
ing assimilation or stability than one of national self-definition.
Further, this self-definition is accomplished through regulating
the family, making it a tenuous fit within its power over immi-
gration. Unlike the "vast hordes [of Chinese nationals] . . .
crowding in upon us" in Chae Chan Ping v. United States who,
at the time, could not become naturalized U.S. citizens,230 the
current "vast hordes" excluded by congressional policy are indi-
viduals whose life choices are indistinguishable from individu-
als who marry in Massachusetts 231 or enter into civil unions in
Connecticut or Vermont. Granted, recent state amendments
banning same-sex marriage and civil unions are evidence that
the majority of Americans (at least those who come out to vote
on this issue) are not supportive of same-sex marriage. 232 But
that does not answer the question of whether preventing part-
228. For example, while the French Pactj Civil de Solidaritg (PACS) "offers
legal status to all unmarried, heterosexual and homosexual married couples,"
it does not confer all the benefits of marriage. Frederic Martel, The PACS-A
Civil Solidarity Pact (July 2001), http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/pacs.asp.
PACS, among other things, does not allow signatories to jointly adopt a child.
Id.
229. See Civil Union Act 2004, 2004 S.N.Z. No. 102; Civil Partnership Act,
2004, c. 33 (Eng.) (providing civil unions with essentially the same benefits as
those given to married couples).
230. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); see also
supra text accompanying notes 68-70 (discussing Chae Chan Ping).
231. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health extended the right to marry
to same-sex couples in Massachusetts when it ruled that denying gay couples
the right to marry violated the state's constitution. 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70
(Mass. 2003).
232. In 2006, seven states-Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin-voted to amend their constitutions
to ban same-sex marriage, joining nineteen other states that had already ap-
proved such bans. Christine Vestal, Gay Marriage Ripe for Decision in 3
Courts, STATELINE, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story
?contentld=20695.
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ners in same-sex marriage or civil unions from achieving immi-
gration status lies squarely within Congress's plenary power
over immigration.
One possible reason for Congress's decision to exclude
partners in same-sex marriages and civil unions from immigra-
tion status recognition is its desire for uniformity in enforcing
immigration laws-inconsistent enforcement could result if the
question of whether a citizen could obtain immigration status
for her same-sex spouse hinged on the couple's intended domi-
cile. However, this potential lack of uniformity has not influ-
enced Congress's approach regarding other marriage entry re-
strictions, such as those relating to incest. 233
Congressional acceptance of nonuniformity is also appar-
ent in its failure to alter the current judicial approach to mar-
riage. When a marriage does not offend federal public policy
under the Adams test, 234 courts will look to the underlying
state law to determine the result.235 Thus, the idea that laws
regulating marriage must be uniform has been rebuffed consis-
tently in case law, at least in cases not involving same-sex mar-
riage. Finally, Congress's rationale in enacting DOMA had
much less to do with bringing uniformity to immigration law
than with preventing the proliferation of same-sex marriage
within the United States.236 Both the Adams test and DOMA's
definition of the federal public policy on same-sex marriage ap-
pear to have very little to do with regulating immigration and
everything to do with the definition and regulation of marriage
itself.
233. See supra Part III.B.2.
234. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1982) ("A two-
step analysis is necessary to determine whether a marriage will be recognized
for immigration purposes. The first is whether the marriage is valid under
state law. The second is whether that state-approved marriage qualifies under
the [Immigration and Nationality] Act .... Congress did not intend the mere
validity of a marriage under state law to be controlling.").
235. In cases involving incest laws, courts have long been comfortable
granting immigration status to members of couples whose marriages, though
violative of the laws of some states, are recognized in the state in which they
intend to live. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
236. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2906 ("[DOMA] has two primary purposes. The first is to defend the in-
stitution of traditional heterosexual marriage. The second is to protect the
right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal rec-
ognition of same-sex unions, free from any federal constitutional implications
that might attend the recognition by one State of the right for homosexual
couples to acquire marriage licenses.").
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IV. REGULATING THE INTACT MARRIAGE
A. FAMILY LAW AND THE INTACT MARRIAGE
Most family law students read the famous case of McGuire
v. McGuire, in which a wife sued her husband for support dur-
ing their marriage. 237 The facts of the case were compelling:
Mr. McGuire was a wealthy man, and yet there was no toilet,
bathing facilities, or kitchen sink in the house.238 Mr. McGuire
refused to give Mrs. McGuire access to the household finances
or even any spending money, and Mrs. McGuire had gone with-
out new clothes for four years.239 The court recognized that the
"husband's attitude toward his wife, according to his wealth
and circumstances, leaves little to be said in his behalf."240 And
yet the court refused to intervene, for it held that the living
standards of a family are concerns of the household, "and not
for the courts to determine." The court determined that
"[p]ublic policy requires such a holding."241 McGuire has there-
fore come to stand for the idea that courts should not intervene
in intact marriages, an idea known as the doctrine of marital
privacy. 24 2
The result of the continued existence of the doctrine of
marital privacy is that modern married couples are free to
structure their marriages in almost any way they desire: they
can live together or apart, they can use the same surname or
different names, they can have sexual relations or abstain, they
can be monogamous or adulterous, they can pool their finances
or keep separate bank accounts, and they can be supportive or
destructive of each other's aspirations.243 It is not until divorce,
237. 59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953).
238. Id. at 337-38.
239. Id. at 337.
240. Id. at 342.
241. Id.; see also Lee E. Teitelbaum, The. Family as a System: A Prelimi-
nary Sketch, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 537, 542 (noting that McGuire and similar
cases involving spousal relations regard the family as a "freestanding thing,
... distinct from the state" that "must be given some decisional space").
242. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, The Public and Private Ordering of Marriage,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 298 n.13.
243. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (estab-
lishing a broad right to privacy within marital relationships and finding the
idea of controlling contraception and similar relationship-oriented decisions by
married persons "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship").
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if then, that any of these choices become fodder for judgment or
intervention by the law.
One way in which state law treats intact marriages as pri-
vate is in its refusal to deem marriages fraudulent, even where
fraud seems to have occurred. This refusal most often occurs in
cases where one party to a marriage is seeking annulment. 244
Most state courts have restricted annulment for fraud to cases
involving misrepresentations that go to the "essentials" of the
marriage, defined as the capacity or willingness to procreate or
have sexual intercourse. 245 Other kinds of fraud, such as con-
cealing a serious drinking problem, lying about one's income or
prospects, or concealing a lack of concern with physical appear-
ance or manners, have been judged insufficient to demonstrate
fraud because they do not go to the "essentials" of the mar-
riage-procreation and sex.246 If a party to a business contract
committed these types of fraud, a court would hear the case,
but marital "privacy" prevents courts from granting a remedy
in cases where the fraud resulted in marriage. States can de-
clare marriages that lack the potential for procreation to be
nonmarriage. 247 But notably, they can do this only when one of
244. See, e.g., Blair v. Blair, 147 S.W.3d 882, 886-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that a wife's misrepresentation that her husband was the father of
her child did not constitute grounds for an annulment).
245. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1506(a)(4) (1999) (requiring a court
to enter a decree of annulment when "[olne party entered into the marriage in
reliance upon a fraudulent act or representation of the other party, which
fraudulent act or representation goes to the essence of the marriage"); Wolfe v.
Wolfe, 389 N.E.2d 1143, 1144-45 (111. 1979) (granting an annulment after find-
ing that a wife's misrepresentation to her Roman Catholic husband that her
former husband was dead went to the "essentials" of the marriage relation-
ship, rendering it impossible for the husband "to continue to perform the du-
ties and obligations of his marriage"); Lyon v. Lyon, 82 N.E. 850, 852 (Ill.
1907) (defining "essentials" as those things that make "impossible the per-
formance of the duties and obligations of that relation, or render[] its assump-
tion and continuance dangerous to health or life"). Some courts have adopted a
rule that if a wife is a virgin at marriage and remains so after five years of
marriage, her husband will be presumed impotent. See, e.g., Tompkins v.
Tompkins, 111 A. 599, 601 (N.J. Ch. 1920) (finding that a presumption of im-
potency arose when a husband did not have sexual intercourse with his wife of
five years, and declaring the marriage null as a result).
246. See, e.g., Johnston v. Johnston, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253, 254-55 (Ct. App.
1993) (finding no fraud where a wife claimed that her husband had "turned
from a prince into a frog"); Bielby v. Bielby, 165 N.E. 231, 233 (Ill. 1929)
("False representations as to fortune, character, and social standing are not
essential elements of the marriage, and it is contrary to public policy to annul
a marriage for fraud... as to personal qualities.").
247. See Wolfe, 389 N.E.2d at 1145 (finding a marriage void because a Ro-
man Catholic husband was "unable to continue marital cohabitation" with his
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the parties brings an action to annul the marriage; state courts
(or police, or social workers) do not routinely inquire whether
parties to a marriage are impotent or infertile.
Despite courts' reluctance to interfere in internal family
matters, state law affects the substance of intact marriages in
many ways. For instance, most states treat rape within a mar-
riage as a less serious crime than rape that occurs outside of
marriage.248 In addition, state law prescribes the various bene-
fits and burdens of marriage, including evidentiary privi-
leges, 249 the ability to make medical decisions for one's
spouse, 250 and the treatment of assets as marital or community
property.251 The rationale behind some of these regulations is
the preservation of marital privacy and harmony. 252
Significantly, there is one way in which state law regula-
tion of intact marriages is increasing: intensified interest in
and prosecution of domestic violence within marriage.253 Rising
awareness of intimate violence as a social and criminal problem
has made law enforcement officials more willing to intervene in
cases that were once considered private, family matters. 25 4
wife upon discovering that his wife had misrepresented that her former hus-
band had died).
248. See Hasday, supra note 23, at 1374, 1484 (noting that a majority of
states retain some form of the common law rule exempting husbands from
prosecution for raping their wives).
249. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 753 A.2d 84, 89-96 (Md. 2000) (detailing the
history and meaning of Maryland's marital communications privilege).
250. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5(2)(c) (2001) (authorizing
a "patient's spouse not judicially separated" to make medical decisions for an
incompetent patient); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2896 (2005) (giving a patient's
spouse authorization to make decisions about medical treatment on behalf of
the patient when the patient is "incapable of making an informed decision").
251. Cf. Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (Haw. 1977) (describing
various states' treatment of joint tenancies held by married couples).
252. The exemption from prosecution for husbands who rape their wives,
for example, is thought to '"remove a substantial obstacle to the resumption of
normal marital relations."' Hasday, supra note 23, at 1488 (quoting People v.
Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (en banc)).
253. See Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race,
Class, and the Politics of the Battered Women's Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 281, 289 (1997).
254. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence
Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 11 (1999); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home,
116 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2006).
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Mandatory arrest 255 and "no drop" 256 policies are effectively
regulations of intact marriages, for these policies remove the
veil of family privacy by refusing to allow an individual to de-
cide whether his or her spouse will be charged with a crime
that occurred within the "private sphere."257 These laws form
part of the body of family law to the extent that their goal is to
intervene in intact marriages by changing the power dynamic
and disallowing certain kinds of physical contact.258
B. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE INTACT MARRIAGE
In contrast, immigration law requires the government to
intrude into intact marriages much more extensively. This
wide-ranging intrusion is most evident in DHS's screening of
immigrant marriages in search of immigration fraud and in the
heightened protection afforded to battered immigrant spouses.
1. The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments
As explained above, "marriage fraud" is narrowly defined
in state family law.259 Generally, in order to have committed
fraud a spouse must have lied about his or her ability or will-
ingness to procreate or engage in sexual intercourse. 260 But in
the context of immigration law, "marriage fraud" means some-
thing very different. Rather than concentrating on the procrea-
tive and sexual "essentials" of the marriage, immigration law is
concerned with the couple's matrimonial intention at the time
they married.26 1 Because immigration status is a scarce benefit,
the law attempts to ferret out those people who are using mar-
riage in an instrumental way to achieve immigration status.2 62
255. See, e.g., Fedders, supra note 253, at 289 (noting that by the mid-
1990s, almost half of the states had adopted mandatory arrest statutes, re-
quiring police officers to make arrests in domestic violence cases, rather than
allowing police officers to use their discretion).
256. See Epstein, supra note 254, at 15 (explaining that prosecutors in do-
mestic violence cases often "have adopted no-drop policies--once charges are
brought, a case proceeds regardless of the victim's wishes").
257. See id.
258. See Suk, supra note 254, at 7 (arguing that the home has become a
space "in which criminal law deliberately and coercively reorders and controls
private rights and relationships in property and marriage-not as an incident
of prosecution, but as its goal").
259. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
261. INA § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).
262. See 132 CONG. REc. 27,012, 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep.
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Married people must therefore prove that they are married and
that their marriage is "bona fide"-that is, not entered into
solely for immigration purposes. 263 Proving bona fides can be
difficult, for a marriage certificate may show that a couple was
legally married, but it does not show the reason they married.
Thus, in combating fraud, immigration officials frequently look
for more-they seek to determine whether the couple is acting
married, even though they have the legal documentation to
prove that they actually are married.264
Although all applicants for immigration benefits based on
marriage must demonstrate the bona fides of their relation-
ships, this pressure to "act" married is particularly acute for
couples who have recently married. It makes good sense to
think that immigration marriage fraud is more likely to occur
in marriages commenced shortly before immigration. After all,
if people have been married for a long time, it is unlikely that
their long-past decision to marry was motivated by a desire to
facilitate immigration benefits at some future time. Immigra-
tion law reflects this idea in the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments (IMFA) of 1986, which subject couples married
for less than twenty-four months to a more searching scrutiny
than other couples experience. 265 Unlike other spouses who
gain admission under the "immediate relative" category,
spouses in marriages less than twenty-four months old must
wait an additional two years before obtaining permanent resi-
dency. 266 During that time, the spouse has only "conditional"
permanent residency and is subject to deportation if DHS de-
termines during that two-year period that the marriage is not
bona fide.267
McCollum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of
1986).
263. 8 C.F.R. § 116.4 (2006).
264. See id.
265. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
639, § 216(g), 100 Stat. 3537, 3541 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(g) (2000)) (de-
fining the category of marriages subject to the conditional residence require-
ment of section 216 of the INA).
266. INA § 216(c)-(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)-(d) (2000).
267. Id. § 216(b). Immigration law seeks to curb two species of marriage
fraud: bilateral fraud and unilateral fraud. The first, bilateral fraud, typically
involves direct payments by foreigners to U.S. citizens or permanent residents
in return for permanent residency through marriage. 132 CONG. REC. at
27,015 (statement of Rep. McCollum). The second, unilateral fraud, is a "more
invidious" kind, where a foreign man or woman tricks a citizen into marriage,
"intentionally duping this person into believing that they are really in love,
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In order to remove the "conditional" portion of her perma-
nent residency status, an individual must petition jointly with
her spouse for removal of the condition within a ninety-day pe-
riod before the second anniversary of the grant of conditional
status.268 Even at this point, immigration authorities could still
decide that the marriage is a sham and institute deportation
proceedings against the immigrant spouse. 269 Unsurprisingly,
the joint petition requirement has created problems in cases
where the U.S. citizen spouse refuses to sign the joint peti-
tion. 270 However, waivers are available in several instances, in-
cluding when the parties have divorced and the immigrant was
not at fault in failing to submit the joint petition or when the
immigrant spouse was 'battered by or was the subject of ex-
treme cruelty perpetrated by his or her spouse."271
With the passage of IMFA, the INS promulgated regula-
tions illustrating how a couple could demonstrate that their
marriage was bona fide when entered. Under the regulations,
the couple must attach evidence to its joint petition that dem-
onstrates that the marriage was not "entered into for the pur-
pose of evading the immigration laws of the United States. '272
This standard is related to but distinct from the standard that
had developed through existing case law prior to the passage of
IMFA. The leading case on marriage fraud before IMFA, Bark
v. INS, had established the principle that a "marriage is a
sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
that there is true matrimonial intent here," only to divorce the unlucky spouse
once permanent residency has been obtained. Id. at 27,015-16. No one has es-
tablished with certainty how severe the marriage fraud problem was before
the passage of IMFA. Congress's preoccupation with fraud in passing the
IMFA has been traced to an erroneous INS report that estimated that thirty
percent of marriages bringing immigrant spouses to the United States were
fraudulent. Joan Fitzpatrick, The Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration Pol-
icy, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23, 33 (1997). The INS later estimated that the
number was closer to eight percent-still a significant number. Id. The conse-
quences of a finding of marriage fraud are harsh, for not only is the immigrant
spouse deportable, but he is also permanently ineligible for legal immigrant
status. INA § 204(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (2000).
268. INA § 216(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(2).
269. Id. § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000) (listing marriage
fraud as grounds for deportation).
270. See, e.g., Sandra D. Pressman, The Legal Issues Confronting Condi-
tional Resident Aliens Who Are Victims of Domestic Violence: Past, Present,
and Future Perspectives, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129, 149-50 (1995).
271. INA § 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4).
272. 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5) (2006).
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together at the time they were married."27 3 Notice that this
standard is different from the IMFA standard: a couple could
fail the Bark test (because the spouses did not "intend to estab-
lish a life together") yet pass the IMFA test because they did
not enter into marriage "for the purpose of evading the immi-
gration laws." For example, a couple might marry to legitimate
a child, to please a parent, or to hide one spouse's sexual orien-
tation-all cases where the purpose of marriage was not to es-
tablish a life together yet cases where the parties did not in-
tend to evade immigration laws. Nevertheless, the regulations
encourage petitioners to produce evidence in support of their
petitions that is responsive to both the Bark standard and
IMFA. This evidence includes: (1) "[d]ocumentation showing
joint ownership of property," (2) a "[lease showing joint ten-
ancy of a common residence," (3) "[d]ocumentation showing
commingling of financial resources," (4) "[b]irth certificates of
children born to the marriage," (5) "[a]ffidavits of third parties
having knowledge of the bona fides of the marital relationship,"
and (6) "[other documentation establishing that the marriage
was not entered into in order to evade the immigration laws of
the United States."274
Cohabitation, commingling of finances, and reproduction
are the three primary ways of proving the bona fides of a mar-
riage. 275 All three of these factors, though, involve events that
happen after the marriage takes place, and courts use these
events to try to determine what the couple intended at the mo-
ment of marrying.276 This inquiry requires immigration judges
273. 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
274. 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5)(i)-(vi).
275. One court found that an apartment lease in both spouses' names,
without other evidence, was not enough to demonstrate a bona fide marriage.
Maina v. United States, 179 F. App'x 577, 582 (11th Cir. 2006). Another court
found that evidence of a joint bank account, joint federal tax returns, a resi-
dential lease in both names, and a utility bill in both names was insufficient
where the husband fathered two children with another woman. Oddo v. Reno,
17 F. Supp. 2d 529, 532-33 (E.D. Va. 1998), aff'd, 175 F.3d 1015 (4th Cir.
1999); Brief for Appellee at 4, 7, Oddo, 175 F.3d 1015 (No. 98-2411), 1998 WL
34094282. In another case, joint tax returns and a joint bank account were not
enough to demonstrate a bona fide marriage where cohabitation only lasted
three months, the marriage was never consummated, and the husband had
sexual relations with another woman. United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701,
704 (7th Cir. 2006). Yet another court found marriage fraud where the hus-
band was twenty-three, the wife was fifty-nine, and the couple never had a
common address before separating. Roos v. United States, 167 F. App'x 752,
753 (11th Cir. 2006).
276. Bark, 511 F.2d at 1202 (holding that conduct occurring after the wed-
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to walk a tricky tightrope. One step too far in one direction will
mean that immigrants who commit marriage fraud will achieve
immigration status because they go through the pro forma re-
quirements for a valid marriage even if postwedding evidence
clearly shows that they had no intent to marry for any reason
other than immigration purposes. One step too far in the other
direction, however, and the court is passing judgment on the
marriage as a marriage, essentially deciding that if it does not
look like the kind of marriage most people would have, it must
be fraudulent. Thus, the Bark court insisted that "[a]liens can-
not be required to have more conventional or more successful
marriages than citizens."277 Other courts have emphasized that
evidence of separation following the wedding, standing alone,
does not establish that a marriage was a sham. As the Bark
court explained, "Couples separate, temporarily and perma-
nently, for all kinds of reasons that have nothing to do with any
preconceived intent not to share their lives, such as calls to
military service, educational needs, employment opportunities,
illness, poverty, and domestic difficulties." 278
It is difficult to evaluate how effective IMFA has been in
practice. Although reliable statistics do not exist, there is evi-
dence that even with what appears to be a fairly stringent
process, fraudulent marriages still frequently occur. Marriage
fraud rings are occasionally discovered and prosecuted. For ex-
ample, in 2006 federal immigration officials indicted twenty-
four people for engaging in marriage fraud.2 7 9 The scheme in-
volved soliciting U.S. citizens to travel to Vietnam to enter into
fictitious engagements and marriages with Vietnamese citizens
to facilitate their immigration to the United States. 28 0 Numer-
ous other schemes have been prosecuted in the past three
ding may be considered to the extent that it "bears upon their subjective state
of mind" at the time of the wedding).
277. Id. at 1201-02; see also Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 96, 102-03 (1st Cir.
2005) (emphasizing that marriages can be unconventional or can have various
motivations without being sham marriages); United States v. Orellana-Blanco,
294 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Tagalicud, 84 F.3d 1180,
1185 (9th Cir. 1996). But see Darif, 446 F.3d at 710 (affirming the district
court's refusal to give a jury instruction including the language from Bark and
calling the requested instruction "simply irrelevant").
278. Bark, 511 F.2d at 1202.
279. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 24 Indicted
in ICE-Led Probe into Largest Marriage Fraud Scheme in Utah History (Aug.
8, 2006), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/
060808saltlakecity.htm.
280. Id.
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years. 281 The frequency of the prosecutions and the number of
people involved suggest that even with the procedures set forth
in IMFA and its implementing regulations, immigration offi-
cials miss substantial instances of fraud. At the same time,
though, there is a limit to the amount of time immigration offi-
cials can spend investigating marriages and, for couples who
are legitimately married, there is a cost associated with re-
peated interviews and a fear of "failing" the IMFA test. More
importantly, reported ,cases indicate that some immigration of-
ficials have difficulty telling a "real" marriage from a "fraudu-
lent" one, and that just as many fraudulent marriages slip
through the cracks, some genuine marriages are not recognized
as such.
Take, for example, the case of Agnes Cho, a Chinese citizen
of Burmese descent. 282 Cho's case first came to the INS's atten-
tion when she sought to petition to have the condition removed
from her conditional permanent residency. 283 Because she was
divorced from her husband, she needed a waiver from the nor-
mal joint petition requirement,284 and she had the burden to
prove that she had married in good faith. 285 Cho appeared to
have everything going for her: a two-year long courtship pre-
ceding the marriage; visits by each spouse to meet the families
of the other; plans for a formal reception in Taiwan; cohabita-
tion at the home of the husband's parents; a joint health insur-
ance policy; and joint tax returns, bank accounts, credit cards,
and automobile financing agreements. 286 She had the addi-
tional good luck to have married a naturalized U.S. citizen of
281. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FACT
SHEET: DOCUMENT AND BENEFIT FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS (2006), available at
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/dbf061211.htm (describing the arrest of
twenty-six individuals living in New York for involvement in a marriage fraud
ring bringing in immigrants from Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Pakistan,
St. Vincent, and Trinidad); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, South Florida
Marriage Fraud Ring Dismantled (Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/050930-O1.html (announcing indictments
of a marriage fraud ring which brought in at least 112 immigrants from nu-
merous South American countries, the Dominican Republic, Germany, and Is-
rael); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, California Man Sentenced in Mar-
riage and Visa Fraud Scheme (Oct. 25, 2004), available at http://www
.state.gov/m/ds/rls/37403.htm (describing the prosecution of an immigration
fraud ring bringing immigrants from Cambodia).
282. Cho, 404 F.3d at 98.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See INA § 216(c)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (2000).
286. Cho, 404 F.3d at 103.
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Burmese descent who had immigrated from China 28 7 (immigra-
tion officials might be more likely to suspect fraud where mem-
bers of a couple are racially or ethnically distinct from one an-
other). Finally, she had a good excuse for getting divorced: her
husband had cheated on her and subjected her to domestic vio-
lence. 28s Despite this extensive evidence showing many indicia
of "intent to establish a life together,"28 9 the INS, the immigra-
tion judge, and the BIA all found that Cho's marriage was
fraudulent.290
The BIA found Cho's marriage to be fraudulent for several
reasons. First, her husband had an affair, and the court con-
strued the affair as evidence that the marriage was a sham
from the start.291 In addition, Cho came to her INS conditional
residency interview with counsel representation and documen-
tation of her husband's violent abuse, and her husband kicked
her out of the house following the interview. 292 The BIA inter-
preted her moving out immediately after the interview as evi-
dence that Cho had married to get permanent residency. 293 In
this case, despite the standard set forth in IMFA, a marriage
that had broken down was misconstrued as a marriage that
was fraudulent from the start. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed the BIA, finding that Cho satisfied the
good faith marriage requirement.294
An immigrant who was less lucky (and perhaps less de-
serving) was Mohamed Jamal Krazoun. An immigrant from
Syria, he was married at various times to three different U.S.
citizens. He married the first, Magnolia Arungo-Garcia, in
1983.295 Although she petitioned for his permanent residency,
she withdrew the petition after he began to subject her to ver-
bal abuse, harassment, and threats. 296 She also obtained a re-
straining order against him.29 7 Krazoun and Arungo-Garcia
were divorced by 1984.298 In 1989, Krazoun married again, this
287. Id. at 98.
288. Id. at 103.
289. Id. at 100.
290. Id. at 98.
291. Id. at 103.
292. Id. at 104.
293. Id. at 103-04.
294. Id. at 104.
295. Krazoun v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 208, 209 (1st Cir. 2003).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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time to Georgia Balesteri. 299 In January 1990, Balesteri had
also obtained a restraining order and the couple ceased cohabit-
ing.300
Krazoun's troubles with the INS began in March 1991
when he used his marriage to Balesteri to apply for conditional
permanent residency. 30 1 In 1993, he appears to have forged
Balesteri's name in filing a joint petition to convert his status
to that of permanent resident.3 0 2 On the petition, Krazoun lied:
he claimed that he and Balesteri had continued to cohabit
when they had not.30 3 He also appears to have lied to the INS
in person, claiming that Balesteri would continue to attend INS
interviews, which she had no intention of doing.304 In May
1994, Balesteri filed for divorce, at which point the INS initi-
ated deportation proceedings against Krazoun.305
In November 1994, an immigration judge found that Kra-
zoun was deportable.30 6 At this point, Krazoun applied for a
waiver of the joint petition requirement, claiming that he had
married Balesteri in "good faith," that it was not a sham mar-
riage, and that the marriage had terminated.30 7 Nonetheless,
the immigration judge ordered Krazoun deported, specifically
finding that "Krazoun had married both Arungo-Garcia and
Balesteri for the purpose of evading the United States immi-
gration laws."3 08 The evidence supporting this conclusion, how-
ever, was thin. According to the immigration judge, the conclu-
sion that the marriages were both shams was based on three
pieces of evidence: (1) that Krazoun misled the INS by stating
that Balesteri would attend a 1993 INS interview, (2) that Kra-
zoun lied about continuing to cohabit with Balesteri, and (3)
that both Balesteri and Arungo-Garcia had obtained restrain-
ing orders against Krazoun shortly after their marriages. 30 9
There was no evidence other than the restraining order to sug-
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
309. Id.
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gest that the marriage to Arungo-Garcia was fraudulent. Ver-
bal abuse and mendacity appear to have constituted fraud.
The last chapter in the Krazoun story (and the one that led
to his First Circuit appeal) occurred after he married Janice
Gittino in September 2001, seven years after his divorce from
Balesteri. In June 2002, Krazoun petitioned the BIA to reopen
his case, claiming that his third marriage was bona fide, and
that Gittino was expecting a child in October. 310 Because depor-
tation proceedings were underway, Krazoun had to present
"clear and convincing evidence" that his marriage to Gittino
was bona fide.311 The court found his evidence lacking, but held
in the alternative that even if he had presented "clear and con-
vincing" evidence of a bona fide marriage, the immigration
judge could have denied Krazoun a discretionary adjustment of
status "based exclusively upon his history of recurrent immi-
gration fraud."312
Thus, Krazoun lost the right to remain with his wife and
child not because his marriage was necessarily fraudulent but
because a previous court, apparently offended by his misrepre-
sentations to the court and violence towards his previous wives,
decided, without much evidence, that his first two marriages
were fraudulent. This case is illustrative of the problem inher-
ent in marriage fraud cases: it is impossible to tell from the re-
cord whether the marriage was a sham or not. In Krazoun's
case, the judges appear to have tested his marriages against
certain standards-nonviolence, permanence, openness, truth-
fulness-and found them lacking. But they never identified a
fact proving that any of his marriages were fraudulent.
The point here, of course, is not that Krazoun did not de-
serve to be deported-the INS might have had a case against
him based solely on the misrepresentations he had made, or
based on visa overstays.313 The case is striking, however, when
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 212.
313. Technically, Krazoun was probably ineligible for adjustment to per-
manent resident status because he had lied to the INS. Id. Under INA
§ 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (2000), misrepresentations or fraud
render an immigrant inadmissible and therefore ineligible for adjustment of
status. See id. § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000), amended by Act of Aug. 12,
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-271, § 6(f)(1), 120 Stat. 750, 763. In addition, Krazoun
may have been deportable for overstaying his visa. See id. § 237(a)(1)(C), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (2000). What is curious is that the immigration officials
felt the need to charge marriage fraud rather than one of these more mundane
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one considers that bad behavior during a marriage can be used,
in the immigration context, as evidence that the marriage is a
sham, despite courts' purported standard of not requiring im-
migrants' marriages to be more successful than anyone else's
marriages. 314 By making spouse a category for gaining immi-
gration status, Congress has necessarily embroiled DHS in the
difficult business of passing judgment on individual marriages.
One inevitable result of an immigration policy that uses
marriage as a category for admission is that immigrants are
required to self-police their marriages, crafting the kind of
marriages that they think will pass muster in immigration ser-
vice interviews even where the marriages they had anticipated
having would have looked much different. 315 As the previous
examples illustrate, some couples make misrepresentations to
immigration authorities about details that they (rightly) be-
lieve will raise eyebrows. As in Krazoun, it is difficult to ascer-
tain why the misrepresentations were made: Was it because
they knew they were committing fraud and wanted to cover it
up? 316 Or did they know that their marriage was unusual, and
so they told the immigration authorities what they thought the
authorities wanted to hear?317 In one case, an immigrant failed
to state that he was living separately from his wife, presumably
because he believed that this information would raise the sus-
picions of immigration officials. 318 As often happens, DHS dis-
covered the omission and found that it was material to the mer-
its of his case and thus constituted a misrepresentation,
leading to a denial of his petition. 319 Regardless of whether the
petitioner's marriage was a sham, his belief that DHS would
offenses.
314. See Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 96, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2005); Bark v. INS,
511 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1975).
315. See Kikuyo Matsumoto-Power, Comment, Aliens, Resident Aliens, and
U.S. Citizens in the Never-Never Land of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
15 U. HAw. L. REV. 61, 62-80 (1993) (discussing the potential conflict between
cultural marital practices and IMFA requirements).
316. Krazoun, 350 F.3d at 209.
317. See, e.g., Monter v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 546, 557-58 (2d Cir. 2005)
(finding marriage fraud where a husband's credibility was diminished because
he lied about being separated from his wife); Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, 406
F.3d 1135, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the petitioner's filling out a form
without listing children from prior relationships "enhanced [the petitioner's]
claim that his marriage to [his wife] was in good faith and therefore went to
the heart of the matter").
318. Monter, 430 F.3d at 557-58.
319. Id.
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think it was and his subsequent cover-up led to his deporta-
tion.320 Other provisions provide similar dilemmas for couples.
For example, the birth of children during the two-year condi-
tional period while an immigrant spouse is waiting to become
eligible for permanent residency will not provide equitable
grounds to defer deportation if the marriage is later found to be
fraudulent. 321 Yet birth of children is evidence of a bona fide
marriage. 322 So what should a couple do? Forgo a family for the
moment to prevent a possible separation down the line should
the marriage be found a sham, or begin a family to bolster the
claim that the marriage is valid?
Another participant in the immigration process assists in
policing the behavior of spousal immigrants: lawyers groom
their immigrant clients to pass their immigration interviews.
Many practitioners weed out clients who are engaging in sham
marriages by questioning each client carefully about his or her
partner's personal habits and the couple's daily routine to-
gether. 323 In determining whether to further represent an im-
migrant couple, practitioners, just like DHS officials, use evi-
dence that a couple is living together to determine whether the
couple has a bona fide marriage.324 Lawyers report asking for
items such as a joint lease, vacation photographs, joint utility
bills, tax returns, insurance documents, credit card bills, and
evidence that the wife has adopted the husband's name. 325 Still
others make surprise visits, dropping by couples' houses with
the excuse of needing to pick up their passports, or calling late
in the evening to ask them further questions.326 One lawyer
320. Id. ("[The petitioner's] failure to state that he was living separately
from his wife 'was predictably capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency
to affect, the official decision.' . . . [T]he fact of Monter's separation was clearly
linked to a statutory ground for removability: The knowledge that Monter and
his wife lived in separate residences would lead investigators to question the
bona fides of their marriage." (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759,
771 (1988))).
321. Joe A. Tucker, Assimilation to the United States: A Study of the Ad-
justment of Status and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Statutes, 7 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 20, 22 (1989).
322. 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(5)(iv) (2006).
323. Hilary Sheard, Ethical Issues in Immigration Proceedings, 9 GEO. IM-
MIGR. L.J. 719, 736 (1995).
324. Id. at 737.
325. Id.
326. Id. Lawyers have an incentive to investigate their clients' cases care-
fully-if they assist their clients in making false claims of marriage for immi-
gration purposes, they may face criminal charges or state bar disciplinary ac-
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who engaged in this behavior admitted that it is difficult to
judge a marriage based on paper documentation, declaring,
"I've almost always been wrong about those I suspected of
fraud."
3 2 7
Ultimately, IMFA is an example of a law that directly
regulates immigration and has unintentional but substantial
effects on marriage itself. In attempting to deter immigration
fraud, Congress is exercising its core immigration power. Con-
gress's plenary power over immigration gives it the right to de-
cide who will be admitted or excluded from the country, and
Congress has made a decision that family ties are a good proxy
for successful immigration. It thus falls to Congress (and DHS)
to find a way of implementing this policy that allows those peo-
ple who meet the requirements to gain admission, while pre-
venting those who do not from abusing the system. As this sec-
tion has shown, there are some difficult policy choices endemic
to spousal immigration: if the government imposes too little
scrutiny, many fraudulent marriages will slip by, but if it im-
poses too much scrutiny, immigration officials will be interfer-
ing in very private relationships. Taken as a whole, IMFA is a
successful middle road, for although the cases show that it can
be difficult to implement in some circumstances, the reported
cases are by definition the particularly difficult ones. The two-
year conditional status for some marriages allows DHS to con-
centrate its efforts on those marriages which seem most likely
to be fraudulent while providing immigrants who have been
married longer with a less intrusive path to residency. Al-
though Congress's choices certainly could be (and have been)
extensively critiqued,328 its power to make these choices is on
firmer footing than some of the other regulations of marriage
through immigration law, such as IMBRA or DOMA. Once it
extends the benefit of immigration status to the spouses of citi-
tion. Id. at 735.
327. Id. at 737.
328. Judges, legislators, and commentators have criticized IMFA. See Azizi
v. Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. 86, 96 n.l1 (D. Conn. 1989) ("[I]n trying to ferret
out those who abuse our marriage-related immigration laws, recent news indi-
cates we may have gone too far."' (quoting Sen. Paul Simon)); Fitzpatrick, su-
pra note 267, at 31-33; Charles Gordon, The Marriage Fraud Act of 1986, 4
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 183, 187 (1990) (citing a district judge who said that the law
was analogous to the situation "of a fellow who burns his house down to get at
a few rats"); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Male Fraud, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 511,
533-43 (2000) (arguing that IMFA promotes harmful stereotypes of immigrant
women); Medina, supra note 17, at 696-717 (arguing that the prohibition on
"marriages of convenience" is misguided because they harm no one).
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zens and residents, Congress must find a way to determine
what counts as marriage for immigration purposes, and the
substance of what counts as marriage fraud for immigration
purposes unsurprisingly looks very different from what counts
as marriage fraud under state law.
2. The Violence Against Women Act(s)
A very different example of how immigration law regulates
the intact marriage is the immigration-related provisions of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),329 as well as
subsequent VAWAs passed in 2000 and 2005. 330 VAWA is most
famous for its inclusion of a civil rights remedy for gender-
motivated violence, which the Supreme Court struck down in
United States v. Morrison as beyond the scope of Congress's
commerce power.331 However, several other less controversial
provisions of VAWA are alive and well. VAWA provisions are
sprinkled throughout the INA, generally as default rule excep-
tions for battered spouses or children. For example, some for-
eign nationals who would otherwise be subject to deportation
are eligible for relief from deportation if they meet certain
statutory requirements, such as ten years of continuous physi-
cal presence in the United States. 332 If, however, the potential
deportee is the battered spouse or child of a U.S. citizen or resi-
dent, she need only show three years of continuous physical
presence in the United States. 333
The two most important VAWA provisions for our purposes
involve the procedures through which battered spouses may pe-
tition for green cards. The first is an exception to the usual
green card requirements. Normally, to obtain admission as an
immediate relative or family preference immigrant, an individ-
ual must convince her U.S. citizen or resident spouse to file a
329. Pub. L. No. 103-323, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
330. VAWA 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006); Battered
Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000 (VAWA 2000), Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§§ 1501-1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1518-37 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
331. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19, 627 (2000). For a cri-
tique of Morrison, see Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence
Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 57, 109-24 (2002).
332. INA § 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2000).
333. Id. § 240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006).
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petition sponsoring the immigrant.3 34 This rule gives the citizen
or permanent resident spouse total control over the immigra-
tion process. 335 In doing so, immigration law allows U.S. citi-
zens and residents to define who their families are for immigra-
tion purposes, as long as those individuals otherwise fall within
the designated formal categories. Conversely, if an immigrant
is a battered spouse or the victim of "extreme cruelty" perpe-
trated by her spouse, she can self-petition for immigration
status. 336 Because of her status as a battered spouse, her hus-
band loses control over her immigration process. 337 VAWA thus
creates an exception the usual rule that the U.S. citizen or resi-
dent family member must petition on behalf of the immigrant.
The second relevant provision makes an exception to the
IMFA default rules that govern recent marriages. Recall that
normally, both spouses must petition after a two-year proba-
tionary period to have the "conditional" aspect of an immigrant
spouse's conditional permanent residency removed.338 VAWA
creates an exception to this general rule for cases involving bat-
tering or extreme cruelty.3 3 9 Thus, where a conditional perma-
nent resident spouse is being battered or psychologically
abused, she can avoid the problem of needing to get a control-
ling and abusive spouse to join the petition.
VAWA is unique to the immigration laws discussed so far.
Unlike the family preference and immediate relative categories
and the fianc6 visa provisions, VAWA does not appear to di-
334. Id. § 204(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a), amended by Act of Aug. 12, 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-271, § 6(a), 120 Stat. 750, 762; Act of July 27, 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-248, § 402, 120 Stat. 587, 622-23.
335. For a criticism of the citizen or resident spouse having total control
over the immigration process, see Calvo, Decade, supra note 18.
336. INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii).
337. I use the pronoun she here to refer to the immigrant spouse, for al-
though the VAWA provisions are gender-neutral, the vast majority of immi-
grants asserting rights under the provisions are women. See Skaidra Blanford,
Ayuda Means HELP for Area Latinas, D.C. N., Mar. 2003, at 28, 28,
http://www.consejo.org/pdf/Mar%202003%20Domestic%20Violence.pdf. This
use of VAWA remedies may not reflect reality: some studies show high rates of
domestic abuse of men by women. See Melody M. Crick, Comment, Access De-
nied: The Problem of Abused Men in Washington, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1035,
1043-47 (2004). But it does indicate that women are more likely than men to
perceive that they are entitled to VAWA exceptions and to take advantage of
them.
338. INA § 216(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)(A) (2000).
339. Id. § 216(c)(4). Technically, these are not exceptions but "hardship
waivers," which means that they are discretionary waivers, not statutory enti-
tlements. Id.
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rectly aid Congress in its goal of providing family reunification
for citizens. There is nothing particularly desirable about hav-
ing spouses who have been battered as potential citizens; if
anything, Congress might think that battered spouses would be
just as likely to be a drain on the public fisc as it does people
with communicable diseases or those without financial
means.
340
Instead, VAWA ameliorates some of the harsher effects of
immigration law itself on the day-to-day experiences of immi-
grants in abusive families. The spousal-petition requirement,
for example, made battered immigrants vulnerable to spousal
manipulation. 41 Studies show that a significantly higher num-
ber of immigrant women are battered by their spouses than
women in the general population, 342 and although causation is
difficult to establish, scholars have argued that this higher rate
is the result of Congress's decision to give U.S. citizen spouses
control over the immigration process. 343 VAWA seeks to pre-
vent abusive spouses from using immigration status to wield
control in their marriages, and it does this by putting control
over immigration status into the hands of the battered spouse;
in short, VAWA seeks to regulate power dynamics in an intact
marriage. To the extent that VAWA is a regulation of the fam-
ily and not immigration per se, it has more in common with the
disclosure requirements in IMBRA and the prohibition against
same-sex marriage in DOMA than it does with the IMFA's at-
tempt to ferret out immigration fraud. But VAWA is distin-
guishable from the DOMA mandates, too, for it seeks to regu-
late the family to reduce the harm caused by immigration law
itself.
The immigration provisions of VAWA provide an example
of how categorizing something as immigration law masks the
340. See id. § 212(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (2000) (stating that persons
with certain communicable diseases are inadmissible); id. § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4) (2000 & Supp. II 2002), amended by Act of Aug. 12, 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-271, § 6(b)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 750, 762 (stating that persons likely to be-
come public charges are inadmissible).
341. Pressman, supra note 270, at 149-50.
342. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R.
3083 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 58, 60 (2000) (statement of Leslye Orloff, Director,
Immigrant Women Program, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
343. See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1181, 1200 (2001) (noting that VAWA's immigration provisions resulted
from documentation by activists of the "traps created by IMFA").
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family law aspects of the provision-no one recognizes the pro-
visions as relating to family law. Compare the VAWA provision
that was struck down by the Court in Morrison (civil damages
for gender-motivated violence)3 44 with the immigration provi-
sions that went unchallenged (giving married immigrants who
are battered legal benefits for which other immigrants are in-
eligible). 345 Which law does more to "determine[] the legal
rights and responsibilities of family members":346 the one that
happens to apply equally to married and unmarried victims of
violence, or the one that singles out married victims for special
treatment? Both Congress and the Supreme Court were trou-
bled by a VAWA provision that was explicitly a criminal law on
its face and "exposed" as family law,3 47 but VAWA provisions
that facially concern immigration but also regulate marriage
pass by unnoticed.
V. REGULATING EXIT FROM MARRIAGE
A. STATE FAMILY LAW AND EXIT
States used to pass judgment on a marriage by determin-
ing which party was responsible for its destruction. 348 Only the
"innocent and injured spouse" was entitled to a divorce. 349
Thus, marriage was conceived to be a permanent status that
could only be exited by a material breach by one party and the
desire of the other party to end the relationship. 350 Fault
grounds varied from state to state, but they often included
adultery, extreme cruelty, and desertion.3 51
In 1969, California led the "no-fault revolution" by elimi-
nating the statutory fault grounds.352 California replaced its
344. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605-27 (2000).
345. See supra notes 334-39 and accompanying text.
346. Hasday, supra note 1, at 871.
347. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-17.
348. See, e.g., Ayers v. Ayers, 290 S.W.2d 24, 25-26 (Ark. 1956) (denying a
divorce to the party with greater fault).
349. See Rankin v. Rankin, 124 A.2d 639, 644-45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956) (re-
fusing to grant a divorce where both spouses were "equally at fault" and nei-
ther could "clearly be said to be the innocent and injured spouse").
350. See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1988) (discussing general changes in
marriage law).
351. Id. at 5.
352. Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory
of Wealth Distribution at Divorce: In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS.
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myriad fault grounds with only two: "[i]rreconcilable differ-
ences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the
marriage" and "[i]ncurable insanity."353 The idea behind this
change was that a married couple is made up of two separate
people who may not want to be permanently tied to one an-
other. Since California's move, most states have adopted some
form of no-fault divorce. 354 Even if states retain fault grounds,
they usually also give the option of a no-fault divorce, some-
times after a waiting period of anywhere from sixty days to
three years. 355 Even so-called covenant marriage includes the
possibility of a no-fault divorce with a longer-than-normal wait-
ing period.356 The only states where one cannot currently get a
unilateral no-fault divorce are Mississippi, New York, and Ten-
nessee.357 Marriage, then, has gone from a permanent status to
one that an individual can usually exit, even without the other
spouse's consent. The State adjudicates the terms of the exit,
but in all but a handful of states, does not deny individuals the
right to exit.
The decline of fault grounds and other changes in family
structure have affected the way in which property is allocated
upon divorce. At common law in most states, the husband con-
trolled and owned all of the marital assets. Under the law of
coverture, married women could not own property. 358 Because
of the imbalance of power in these relationships, alimony de-
veloped as a way to ensure that divorced women were not im-
poverished. 359 Alimony awards were supported by a theory of
WOMEN'S L.J. 141, 153 (2004).
353. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 2004).
354. As of 2004, fourteen states and the District of Columbia have only no-
fault grounds for divorce, and thirty-three states have a combination of no-
fault and fault grounds. AREEN & REGAN, supra note 166, at 374.
355. Charts, 38 FAM. L.Q. 809, 812 (2005).
356. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307(A)(5) (2000) (setting forth a two-year
waiting period for a no-fault divorce in a covenant marriage); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 103(1) (1999) (setting forth a six-month waiting period for a no-fault
divorce in a standard marriage).
357. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (2004) (prohibiting divorce on grounds of
irreconcilable differences if the grounds are contested or denied by the other
party); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2007) (allowing no-fault divorce
only upon consent of both parties); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103 (2005) (pro-
hibiting divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences if the grounds are con-
tested or denied by the other party).
358. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *442-45 (discussing
women's legal rights during marriage).
359. See SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 95 (2003) (arguing
that alimony originally functioned as a kind of pension or social security to
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status: a wife obtained the social status of her husband and
was entitled to continue living in the style to which she had be-
come accustomed, 360 provided that she had not been the one to
destroy the marriage. 361
Today, the theory that women are in danger of becoming
public charges no longer has the same resonance that it did in
the nineteenth century. Now that women are able to work in
livable-wage jobs, courts are reluctant to award alimony based
purely on status considerations. 362 Today, temporary alimony
to help a dependent spouse "rehabilitat[e]" herself in the world
of employment is the more common approach.363 Together, the
no-fault revolution and courts' reluctance to award permanent
alimony are evidence that we have largely discarded the as-
sumption that, once married, individuals should be forever tied
to one another, regardless of whether any feelings of commit-
ment remain. 364
prevent divorced women from becoming public charges); June Carbone, The
Futility of Coherence: The ALI's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 46-47 (2002) (argu-
ing that the principle of alimony was derived from the wife's right to dower-
one-third of her husband's estate-for her continuing support at his death);
Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony
Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 198
(1939) (arguing that with the "discriminatory common law scheme of marital
property rights ... in full bloom" and fault-based divorce difficult to acquire, it
was not surprising that a woman's "application for permanent alimony was
treated with sympathy, and with liberality when the circumstances permitted
liberality").
360. See KATZ, supra note 359, at 94 (stating that the amount of an ali-
mony award used to be determined by a woman's station of life during her
marriage). Despite the theory behind alimony awards, it appears that courts
did not grant them very often. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender
Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1989).
361. See, e.g., Lagars v. Lagars, 491 So. 2d 5, 8 (La. 1986).
362. Vivian A. Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 31, 41-42 (2006).
363. Id.; see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 149
(1985) ("While traditional alimony sought to deliver moral justice based on
past behavior of the parties, the new alimony was to deliver economic justice
based on the financial needs of the parties.").
364. Children, of course, are another matter entirely. All states have now
passed child support laws that require noncustodial parents to continue to
support their children after divorce. See Child Support Enforcement Amend-
ments of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 666-667 (West Supp. 2006), amended by Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, §§ 7301(g), 7307(a)(1),
7307(a)(2)(A)(ii), 120 Stat. 4, 145-46 (2006).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
B. IMMIGRATION LAW AND EXIT
Just as immigration law regulates the first three stages of
marriage, it also regulates the last stage, exit. All immi-
grants-and their U.S. citizen or resident spouses-who use
the immediate family or family preferences to achieve status
are required to make a financial commitment to each other that
in many cases may endure beyond the commitment required
under state law. Qualifying for an immigrant visa is not the
last step in legal immigration for a foreign spouse. As discussed
earlier, even if a spouse qualifies under the immediate relative
or family preference categories as the spouse of a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident, the spouse could still be considered inad-
missible for a variety of reasons, such as communicable dis-
eases, criminal history, or prior deportations.3 65 For our pur-
poses, the most important of these restrictions is the public
charge provision. Under the INA, an immigrant is inadmissible
if he is "likely at any time to become a public charge."366 Since
December of 1997, an immigrant entering under the immediate
relative or family preference categories will be deemed a "likely
public charge" unless the sponsoring relative has executed an
affidavit of support. 36 7
The affidavit of support must demonstrate that the spon-
soring relative can support the immigrant at an annual income
that is not less than 125% of the federal poverty line. 368 This
number is calculated by adding the immigrant (and any rela-
tives immigrating with her) to the number of people already in
the sponsor's household and looking up the federally published
salary necessary for that year.3 69 For example, imagine that in
2005, a U.S. citizen petitions for a visa for her German husband
under the immediate relative category. The citizen is a nursing
assistant with three children who makes $30,000 a year. The
German husband has a daughter from a previous marriage who
365. INA § 212(a)(1)-(2), (9), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(1)-(2), (9) (West 2005 &
Supp. 2006), amended by Act of Aug. 12, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-271,
§ 6(b)(1)(C), 120 Stat. 750, 762.
366. Id. § 212(a)(4)(A).
367. Id. § 212(a)(4)(C)(ii). The Act contains an exception for battered
spouses and children. See id. § 212(a)(6)(A)(ii), amended by Act of Aug. 12,
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-271, § 6(b)(1)(B), 120 Stat. 750, 762.
368. Id. § 213A(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1183(a)(1)(A) (2000).
369. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERvs., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
FORM I-864P (2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/l-864p.pdf
[hereinafter FORM I-864P].
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will be accompanying him.37 0 The U.S. resident must therefore
show that she can support a family of six (herself, her three
children, her husband, and her new stepchild) at 125% of the
federal poverty line. In this example, the German husband will
be considered inadmissible as a likely public charge because his
wife does not make 125% of the poverty line, which for a family
of six is $33,500.371 It will be considered irrelevant that the
German husband is skilled in a trade and will be likely to find
work.37 2
The affidavit of support requirement regulates marriage by
making the financial obligation to support a spouse potentially
permanent. There are only five ways that a sponsor's obligation
of support may be terminated: (1) the sponsored immigrant be-
comes a naturalized citizen, (2) the sponsored immigrant works
for forty social security quarters (or, in the case of a married
immigrant, his or her spouse works for forty social security
quarters while they are married), (3) the sponsored immigrant
relinquishes permanent resident status and leaves the country,
(4) the sponsored immigrant obtains new status in a removal
proceeding, or (5) the sponsored immigrant dies.37 3 None of
these exigencies is in the control of the citizen or resident spon-
sor. To return to our previous example, assuming that the
American wife was able to meet the $33,500 minimum and
sponsor her German husband, if they divorced and she refused
to support him or his child, he could sue her for support as long
as he is alive, has not yet naturalized or worked for forty social
370. See INA § 203(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2000) (entitling a child to the
same status as the parent).
371. FORM I-864P, supra note 369.
372. See id. Both the sponsor and the beneficiary's assets are relevant to
the calculation, but only in cases where the sponsor's income is not sufficient.
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
FORM 1-864 INSTRUCTIONS 8 (2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/
form/I-864.pdf [hereinafter FORM 1-864 INSTRUCTIONS]. To qualify for admis-
sion, the sponsor and beneficiary must show that they own assets equal to
three times the difference in income and threshold level on a petition for a
spouse. Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,732,
35,753 (June 21, 2006) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 213a). The beneficiary's
income does become relevant to the calculation under one scenario: where he
can show by a preponderance of the evidence that his income will continue
from the same source after the petition is approved. Id. at 35,749.
373. INA § 213A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(3); Affidavits of Support on Be-
half of Immigrants, 71 Fed. Reg. at 35,754-55. Just as an immigrant spouse
gets credit for "work" if his or her spouse works, a sponsored child gets credit
for "work" if one of his or her parents works while the child is under eighteen.
INA § 203(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).
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security quarters, and remains in the country. Since the deci-
sion to naturalize and the decision to work are in his power, not
hers, she is bound to support him regardless of his proclivities
for work or citizenship.3 7 4 She would no longer have to support
him if he both lost his permanent residency (i.e., by committing
a deportable crime) and left the country. Yet even losing the
permanent resident status or leaving the country, standing
alone, will not terminate the contract. 375 And, crucially, even
divorce will not terminate the obligation of support. 376 The affi-
davit of support creates a tangible and potentially permanent
economic tie.
The actual affidavit of support, as set forth in Form 1-864,
consists of a set of instructions,3 77 a questionnaire that requires
biographical information about the sponsored immigrant and
financial information about the sponsor's income, and a space
for the sponsor to certify under penalty of perjury that the in-
formation is accurate.3 7 8 Prior to 2006, Form 1-864 gave very
little indication that it involved a commitment that was poten-
tially lifelong and could result in a private lawsuit brought by
the immigrant against the sponsoring spouse. The form was re-
cently amended and makes each of these facts clearer than it
did before.3 7 9 But there are still good reasons to think that citi-
zen sponsors executing Form 1-864 are unlikely to understand
374. See Cheshire v. Cheshire, No. 3:05-cv-00453-TJC-MCR, 2006 WL
1208010, at *6-7 & n.12 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2006) (holding that the husband in
a divorce action is liable for payments based on an affidavit of support, that it
is immaterial whether the defendant can afford the judgment, and that the
wife is not required to work). For a criticism of the affidavit of support re-
quirement, see Charles Wheeler, Alien vs. Sponsor: Legal Enforceability of the
Affidavit of Support, 10 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1791, 1791-92 (2005).
375. The sponsor's obligation to support the immigrant also terminates if
the sponsor dies. Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 35,755. But if the deceased sponsor failed to support the immigrant while
alive, the immigrant may sue the deceased's estate. Id. (stating that termina-
tion of the marriage does not relieve the sponsor's estate from any reimburse-
ment obligation that accrued before termination); see also In re Wenninger's
Estate, 1 N.W.2d 880, 882 (Wis. 1942) (holding that an affidavit filed with the
U.S. Department of Immigration is a valid contract).
376. Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 71 Fed. Reg. at 35,740
(declining to add divorce to the circumstances that end the support obligation);
FORM 1-864 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 372, at 3.
377. FORM 1-864 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 372, at 1-11.
378. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
FORM 1-864, at 1-8 (2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/formlI-864
.pdf.
379. Id. at 7 (outlining the conditions that terminate a sponsor's obliga-
tion).
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that, by sponsoring an immigrant relative, they are potentially
making themselves financially responsible for that relative in
perpetuity. First, even with the recent amendments to the
form, the emphasis in the affidavit is on checklists and work-
sheets on which the sponsor sets forth his or her income and
tries to establish eligibility. It is not until page seven of the
form, just before the sponsor's signature block, that the poten-
tial consequences are spelled out.380 Second, even if a sponsor
actually understood the long-term implications of the affidavit
of support, he would be unlikely to refuse to sign it. By the time
he signs the affidavit of support, the sponsor has presumably
waited for months, or perhaps years, to sponsor his relative for
immigration. If the sponsors are married to each other, the
immigration of one may be the only legal way in which they can
be together. In this context, refusing to sponsor an immigrant
would be tantamount to refusing to participate in the relation-
ship, and would be subject to much of the same social disap-
proval as might occur with insistence on a prenuptial agree-
ment. In fact, unlike a prenuptial agreement, the affidavit of
support cannot be altered in any way, so a refusal to sign is not
just a refusal to give the same level of support normally avail-
able under state law, but a refusal to sponsor the spouse for
immigration status at all. 38 ' Thus, both the context in which
the form is signed and its alleged purpose center not on the
long-term relationship between the sponsor and immigrant, but
on the relationship between the immigrant and the state.
Unlike alimony awards, which can create a permanent tie
between divorced partners, the affidavit of support has the po-
tential to create long-term and even permanent ties between an
immigrant, his or her ex-spouse, and people who have no rela-
tionship to the marriage whatsoever. In cases where a spouse
cannot meet the 125% of the federal poverty line requirement,
he or she can have another person sign the affidavit of support
as a joint sponsor. An individual family may have up to two
joint sponsors in addition to the sponsoring spouse; e.g., one
380. Id.
381. We already know that most people do not sign prenuptial agreements
because they are overly optimistic about their chances for a successful mar-
riage or because signing a prenuptial agreement is considered "unromantic."
See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Av-
erage: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 445-49 (1993). There is no reason to think that these
psychological dynamics are not also in play in the context of affidavits of sup-
port, especially given that the consequences of not signing are much higher.
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main sponsor for the whole family, one joint sponsor for one
half of the family, and another joint sponsor for the other half
of the family. 382 To return to our German immigrant example,
since his American wife does not make the requisite $33,500
per year to qualify, she could enlist the help of joint sponsors.
Perhaps she has a friend and an aunt, each of whom has two
children, and each of whom makes $30,000 per year. Her friend
could be the joint sponsor for the husband, and her aunt could
be the joint sponsor for the husband's daughter. Each makes
more than 125% of the poverty line for their own household size
including the sponsored immigrant, which in each of these
cases is four. Because $25,000 per year is 125% of the federal
poverty level for a family of four, each is eligible to be the joint
sponsor of one of the immigrants. 383
The affidavit of support thus further affects marriages in-
volving immigrants by creating the possibility of an outsider to
the marriage gaining a proprietary interest in ensuring that
the sponsor-immigrant relationship remains intact, because the
joint sponsor is much more likely to be sued for support if the
marriage disintegrates than if it continues. While under state
family law there may be interested third parties affected by di-
vorce (children, for example, or creditors who may lose access to
marital property once it is divided), the affidavit of support cre-
ates a unique financial bond between a married couple and
third parties, who may or may not be related to either of the
spouses. Though normally the death of the sponsoring spouse
would end the obligation, if a joint sponsor is involved, she re-
mains liable even after the death of the primary sponsor.384
When Congress instituted the affidavits of support, it ap-
pears to have been mostly concerned with ensuring that immi-
grants would not wind up using means-tested benefits, such as
welfare, Medicare, or Medicaid. The affidavits ensured that the
government could sue a sponsoring family member for reim-
bursement if an immigrant received federal, state, or local
means-tested aid. But section 213A of the INA went further
than merely providing government the opportunity to sue for
reimbursement. It also made affidavits of support enforceable
through private lawsuits by the sponsored immigrant. 385 Immi-
382. Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,732,
35,753 (June 21, 2006) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 213a).
383. For the 2006 poverty guidelines, see FORM I-864P, supra note 369.
384. Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 71 Fed. Reg. at 35,755.
385. INA § 213A(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1183(a)(1)(B) (2000).
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grants have recently brought enforcement actions on affidavits
of support in the context of divorce proceedings, and most of
these actions have been successful.38 6 Although the law has
been in effect for less than a decade, instances of these en-
forcement cases appear to be proliferating. In these cases,
courts have held that the affidavit of support is a contract be-
tween the sponsor and the federal government for the benefit of
the sponsored immigrant.38 7
So far, no one has successfully challenged the enforceabil-
ity of affidavits of support. In only two cases have defendants
managed to get around the requirement, in one case by arguing
that the obligation was taken on before the current law came
into effect, 388 and in the other by demonstrating that the plain-
tiff made substantially more money than he did.389 Even in the
latter case, however, the affidavit was held to be technically en-
forceable: the court simply made the wealthier spouse liable to
indemnify the poorer spouse for his obligation under the affida-
vit as part of an alimony award. 390
In these cases and others, the defendants made many other
arguments that the Form 1-864 affidavit of support is not an
enforceable contract, including ambiguity, vagueness (on the
ground that the contract's term is too indefinite and potential
liability is incalculable), insufficient consideration, adhesion,
386. See Cheshire v. Cheshire, No. 3:05-cv-00453-TJC-MCR, 2006 WL
1208010, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2006) (holding that an affidavit of support is
enforceable until one of five statutory conditions for termination is met);
Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 1290658, at *5 (N.D. Ind. May
27, 2005) (holding that an ex-wife has standing to enforce the affidavit of sup-
port in either state or federal court); Schwartz v. Schwartz, No. CIV-04-770-M,
2005 WL 1242171, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May 10, 2005) (holding that the affidavit
of support is enforceable and that the obligation survives dissolution of mar-
riage); Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, No. Civ.A. 02-1137-A-M2, 2004 WL 5219036,
at *3 (M.D. La. May 27, 2004) (enforcing an affidavit of support as part of a
divorce case); Davis v. Davis, No. WD-04-020, 2004 WL 2924344, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2004) (holding that an affidavit of support is enforceable in
either state or federal court).
387. See, e.g., Stump, 2005 WL 1290658, at *5.
388. Tornheim v. Kohn, No. 00 CV 5084(SJ), 2002 WL 482534, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (holding that a son-in-law could not enforce an affi-
davit of support because it was signed before the Attorney General published
the revised Form 1-864).
389. Shahabudin v. Montford, No. FA010451723S, 2002 WL 442257, at *1-
3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2002) (holding that a plaintiff wife, an emergency
room physician earning $200,000 per year, must reimburse her husband, a po-
lice officer on disability leave, for liabilities that the husband incurs while
meeting his affidavit of support obligations).
390. Id. at *2.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and that jurisdiction is limited to reimbursement actions. 391 In-
deed, it is hard to believe that a prenuptial agreement with
terms identical to the affidavit of support but omitting the U.S.
government as a party to the contract would be enforceable in
many jurisdictions. This is because the unconscionability rules
governing prenuptial agreements are significantly looser than
general contract law, and courts frequently strike provisions
that seemed reasonable on the eve of the wedding and turn out
to be unfair at the time of divorce. 392 Moreover, courts are espe-
cially sensitive to duress in cases involving premarital con-
tracts, suspecting that a person presented with a contract on
the eve of her wedding may not be in a position to refuse to
sign. 393
In creating the affidavit of support requirement, Congress
appears to have been acting within its core immigration power
by establishing a requirement for the admission of immi-
grants-that they not be potential public charges-and creat-
ing a system for implementing that requirement. The enforce-
ment procedures whereby federal and state welfare agencies
may seek reimbursement from the sponsoring spouse seek to
ensure that the immigrant will not become a public charge in a
very real sense-they prevent him from keeping money taken
directly from the public fisc for his support and require his
spouse to support him instead. But the inclusion of a private
right of action against the citizen spouse intrudes further into
state family law. The affidavit of support poses the most diffi-
cult case of where to draw the line between federal immigration
law and state family law. Compared to IMFA, where Congress
seems to be clearly acting within its plenary power over immi-
gration, 394 and to IMBRA, where portions of the law seem likely
391. Wheeler, supra note 374, at 1794-95.
392. See AM. LAW INS., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05 (2003) [hereinafter AIl PRINCIPLES]
(stating that a court should not enforce a term in a premarital agreement that
would "work a substantial injustice" in certain circumstances).
393. See UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(1) (1983) (stating
that premarital agreements are not enforceable if not entered into voluntar-
ily); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 392, § 7.04 (stating that a rebuttable pre-
sumption of informed consent and no duress exists only where (1) a contract
was executed at least thirty days before the parties' marriage, (2) both parties
were advised to obtain legal counsel, and (3) if one party did not obtain legal
counsel, the agreement stated in understandable language the nature of any
rights or claims otherwise arising at dissolution that are altered by the con-
tract).
394. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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to have exceeded Congress's plenary power, 395 the affidavit of
support is less clearly categorized. On one hand, it is easy to
create a reasonable-sounding immigration purpose. It is one
thing, one might argue, to get married, but another thing en-
tirely to use your marriage to effectuate someone else's immi-
gration. If you want to do that, then you must make a poten-
tially lifelong commitment, even though the laws of marriage
and divorce in your state would not require such a commit-
ment. On the other hand, when states have had exclusive ju-
risdiction over making the laws of marriage and divorce, pass-
ing a law that in some cases might effectively negate them (by,
for example, requiring a court to order someone to pay the
equivalent of permanent alimony to someone who would nor-
mally never be awarded it) seems to tread on states' rights.
CONCLUSION
In each of the four stages, immigration law regulates mar-
riage very differently than family law does. In the first and
third-courtship and the intact marriage-it regulates even
where state family law has an explicitly hands-off attitude to-
ward regulation. In the second and fourth stages-entry and
exit-it regulates more intrusively and extensively than does
state family law.
Sometimes this regulation of marriage, as with IMFA, ap-
pears to be an unintentional side effect of implementing immi-
gration policy. In the case of IMFA, Congress was attempting to
police the fraud that was the inevitable by-product of an immi-
gration system that privileges spouses of citizens over other po-
tential immigrants. Congress's goal of fraud prevention neces-
sarily required it to spell out what kinds of marriages would
qualify as legitimate. In other cases, Congress is engaged in a
kind of backpedaling, attempting to intervene in marriage be-
cause of problems caused by immigration law itself. The provi-
sions of VAWA that exempt battered spouses from the joint pe-
tition requirement, for example, make sense as an attempt to
mitigate the harshness of the usual immigration rules. Finally,
a third type of regulation intervenes in marriage because of
congressional disapproval of certain relationships. IMBRA
makes exceptions for "cultural" or "religious" matchmaking or-
ganizations not because matchmaking through these organiza-
tions has been proven to result in a better, smarter, or wealth-
395. See supra Part II.B.2.
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ier immigrant population, but rather because it believes the
marriages emerging from these entities are exempt from the
unacceptable power dynamics it believes most "mail-order
bride" marriages possess. In each case, regardless of Congress's
intent, immigration law is functioning as a form of family law
for those who are regulated by it.
The most significant change that might occur in immigra-
tion jurisprudence if we were to think about immigration law
as functional family law would be in how scholars and courts
theorize about and construct the plenary power doctrine.
Courts might consider, as this Article has done, whether the
immigration provision in question is advancing core immigra-
tion policy goals or instead has ventured outside these goals
into an area that has traditionally been within the province of
the states. The plenary power doctrine has been chipped away
at, modified, criticized, and debated by courts, scholars, and
lawyers for over a hundred years, but its tension with state
control over family law has never before been explored. Law-
makers might decide that principles of federalism mandate
that laws be drafted in a way that will least intrude on state
family law's policy objectives while still fulfilling the goals of
federal immigration policy. Courts interpreting these laws
might construe them narrowly, so that minimal damage would
be done to state law understandings of marriage.
Even in cases where Congress is clearly regulating immi-
gration, and the impact on marriage is an incidental or unin-
tended by-product of its immigration goals, Congress might do
well to acknowledge the effect that immigration law has on
marriage and consider the wealth of experience and informa-
tion that state family law might provide. Family law offers or-
ganizing principles and theoretical models that would help us
to understand the effects immigration law has on families. Im-
migration scholars and lawmakers should examine state family
law to see how and why various doctrines have developed. They
would then be in a better position to calibrate the effects of
immigration law on the family. Even in cases where there is no
question that Congress is acting within its plenary immigration
power, an explicit recognition that immigration legislation
functions as family legislation would force a conversation about
the implications of particular laws for the family and would
prevent immigration law from regulating the family uninten-
tionally. All Americans have an interest in how immigration
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law shapes the marriages of the immigrants who will make up
the next generation of American citizens.
